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Abstract 
 
The paper analyzes tax burden on rural sector and its implication on property right of land. 
First, tax burden on land property and rural activities, and its incidence on land values are 
analyzed; next, the author tries to advance an economic foundation theory for evaluating a 
legal quantitative limit for the determination that judicial intervention had established, or 
may establish in the future, to define or differentiate tax burden as confiscatory and, 
therefore, violating property right. 
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Taxation on Rural Sector: Tax Burden, Land Value and Property Right 
Dr. Horacio L. P. Piffano1 
(piffano@fibertel.com.ar) 
 
 
1) Introduction  
 
Studies and contributions on taxation on rural sector for decades have been of important 
concern for many experts in Argentina and the author has not escaped to this interest.2 
While the topic has been an attractive issue for the economic and political analysis in 
Argentina - a country with obvious economic advantages in agricultural activities, thus 
with important potential tax returns and usual intentions of many governments to use them 
for income redistribution objectives - in present decade has enhanced the academic and 
political interest, and surprisingly has won the general interest of ordinary citizens with a 
singular difference of the one verified in previous decades.  
 
In this heated scenario, the author explores the question of tax burden levied on rural sector 
and its implications for private property right on land.  
 
The aim of the analysis is to arrive or be able to answer two fundamental questions:  
 
1) How tax burden on rural sector should be measured?  
 
2) How to elaborate an economic guideline for determining the legal tax burden limit that 
legislation has already fixed or would have fix in the future, to define a fiscal situation as 
confiscatory? 
                                               
1
 The author acknowledges comments received from Mario Arbolave, Daniel Artana, Ricardo Bara, 
Enrique Bour, Martin Krause, Ricardo Lopez Murphy, Alberto Porto, Lucio Reca and Adolfo 
Sturzenegger; however, is fully responsible for the content of the document. 
2
 See Piffano, H. (2004a, 2004b, 2007); Piffano and Dudiuk (1981, 1982a, 1982b), Porto, Piffano and Di 
Gresia (2007); Piffano and D'Amore (2007); Piffano and Sturzenegger (2009) (in progress).  
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To achieve this aim, first the paper addresses the issue of how tax burden applied on rural 
sector should be measured, whether it is levying an administrative determinate land value 
or over some variable relative to rural activities (for example, cost of production, sale 
prices, etc.). Second, it discusses the issue of the "bracket" used to identify or distinguish a 
fiscal situation as confiscatory and, therefore, violating property right. Finally, the 
conclusions. 
 
It should be recognized that the attempt to link an essentially legal concept - such as 
"confiscation" – to an economic approach for its measurement or determination will not be 
usually found in the economic literature. Perhaps the closest antecedent can be found in a 
recent article by Phillip Magness (2009).3  
 
2) The effects of taxes on rural activities and property right on land 
 
a) Background  
 
The characteristic of ownership in case of a limited resource as land - not renewal and not 
tradable- has been discussed by philosophers, sociologists, ethicists, religious, political 
scientists, lawyers and economists since many centuries ago. Private property has been 
challenged by socialist ideologies that interpret factor of production “land” with a different 
characteristic of reproducible factors of production (labor and capital); for those ethical-
religious-socialist ideologies land should be considered a community ownership without 
exclusion of domain. Of course this approach brings about enormous challenges regarding 
the degree and ways of assignment and management of the common use of land, issue that 
has been analyzed in economics, concluding with the well-known theorem “tragedy of the 
commons”4.  
 
                                               
3
 Magness examines the case brought in U.S. in 1842 by John Calhoun, suggesting that the point of the 
Laffer curve that maximizes the revenue could be used to differentiate tax policy as "tax collection" from 
the one imposing a "protective" barrier and thus contrary to constitutional provisions dealing with free trade 
in the United States.  
4
 Hardin (1968). 
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Discussion background come up from the eighteenth century, from Physiocrats to classics, 
Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1817), and, Henry George (1879), and has gone on till 
now a day, though recognition of private property rights principle has won in practice in 
most countries. The non-capitalist or socialist experiences, such as the ex - Soviet Union or 
today's Cuba, Vietnam or China, are lower in number of countries and relatively narrow in 
scope and duration, but have involve a relatively large population.5 
 
The political intermediate alternative of public ownership of land and leasing mechanism 
for private exploitation, can be seen as operational in some socio-political contexts (as the 
case of Hong Kong),6 but carries on serious questions about its efficient and not corrupt 
manipulation by governments in many countries.7  
 
Assuming that the private property regime will be the scenario prevailing and ever lasting 
in countries like Argentina, we will exclude the alternative of socialization or confiscation 
of land. 
  
b) The relationship between land rent, land value and rural taxation 
 
From the economic point of view and with adequate preservation methods, land is of 
unlimited lasting. So, the land rent can be understood as a permanent stream of earnings or 
surplus after payment of the variable factors (labor and capital), that will be permanent over 
time and, therefore, land acquisition can also be interpreted as the acquisition of a "promise 
                                               
5
 In Argentina the socialist attempt dates back to 1921, in the early history of rural land taxation. See Arceo 
and Basualdo (1997). 
6
 Hong Kong Government (1998). For more information on this alternative see Piffano and Sturzenegger 
(2009). 
7
 The Cuban government, communist experience in Latin-American continent, has just admitted its 
disappointment over the lack of efficiency in the allocation of land and food production. Cuba imports 80% of 
food that consume its 11.2 million people, mainly from U.S., since food and medicines are excluded from the 
blockade that Washington applied to the island since 1962. In the first months of 2009, Cuban imports 
quadrupled in value to exports, leaving the island with a distressing lack of liquidity. Regarding the use of 
land, president Raul Castro gave the latest figures: “690,000 hectares have been delivered, about 39% of the 
‘leisure area’ and were only seeded a third of it”, while announcing a second stage of adjustment of the 
precarious Cuban economy by requiring greater efficiency in land distribution and in food production, he said 
"The land is there, here are the Cubans, we will see if we work or not, if we produce or not. It's not the point 
shouting ‘homeland or death’, ‘down with imperialism’, ‘blockade hits us’, while the land is there, waiting 
for our sweat”. La Nation (2009) and El País (2009). 
 4 
of future income or rent”. Assuming infinite periods, the present value of land results in a 
geometric progression that it is simplified with the familiar formula:  
  
Va = R / i 
 
where:  
 
Va = present value of land  
R = regular (annual) total rent 
i = real interest rate or opportunity cost of capital.8  
 
However, the concept of “land rent” has often been incorrectly understood, like similar to 
an "extraordinary" gain in comparison with the "normal" earnings obtained from activities 
with similar risk. This wrong idea comes up from summing “rent of land” to the “capital 
returns”, rather to understand it as a payment "normal" and "residual" of factor "land". That 
misleading confusion9 causes two important consequences:  
 
a) It confuses the identification of the economic compensation of land use with the capital 
use - two "separate yields" belonging to two different factors of production: capital and 
land - as if they were a unique factor of production (capital). 
b) The superimposition of rent considered as an extraordinary gain added to the normal 
return on capital, reduces the value of land - absorbing a significant portion of rent - to the 
                                               
8
 In any integrated financial system all financial assets should observed the following profitability conditions: 
risk, timing and liquidity of each asset. In case of the acquisition of an asset such as land, the opportunity cost 
to use as reference should have these characteristics: it should be a real rate of return and not a nominal one, 
because the land value similarly to any asset except special circumstances, adjusts with the inflation rate; 
should be an asset with similar risk; should be essentially a non-liquid asset; and, finally, should be a long 
term interest rate, not a short term interest rate.  
9
 Lucio Reca comments that in our country the meaning of "land rent" has also had other interpretations. For 
example, Reca explains that one of the pillars of agricultural economics education in the faculties of 
Agriculture in Argentina was the methodology for calculation of "production costs", which were used during 
many years in the Ministry of Agriculture, and (in theory) serve up to provide "a basis" for setting the 
“sustain prices” for wheat, etc. Land rent was determined with a rate of 3-5% on an approximate valuation of 
land price. They do not regarded rent as a “residual payment” after paying the cost of variable factors of 
production by nature. Land factor had similar category to any other input or factor used in the production 
process. Probably that unconscious collective conception may still be around, adding an element of more 
confusion, by failing to understand that an approximate valuation of the land price eventually encloses the 
true concept of long term residual rent obtaining from it. 
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point of a possible confiscation or indirect expropriation, causing the market value of land 
(not necessarily its social value or shadow price) tends to cero. In front of a null private 
rent (that is, in absence of a portion of social rent appropriable by landowner after payment 
all other factors and taxes), market land value would be cero. 
 
c) How to avoid the mistake of confusing the land rent with the return from capital 
invested in it? 
 
The way to avoid the confusion alluded in the previous section is to realize that rural 
activity is performed in terms of the use of two kinds of factors of production: fixed and 
variables. The former category is identified with the factor “land" (specifically the soil), 
and the latter category would be facilities and buildings, and those inputs substantially 
variable.10 
 
Actually, the factor "land" has two components: the original and indestructible factor land 
or the "raw land" defined by Ricardo, and “extraordinary improvements” as drainage 
channels, land leveling, etc. While these improvements are not original by nature, but arise 
from economic decisions of landowners or governments, they become inseparably attached 
to the original land and they have a very low rate of depreciation, so they have a similar 
characteristic to the fixed-factor of Ricardo. The facilities and buildings make up the rest of 
the improvements in the rural property, usually called “ordinary improvements”, such as 
facilities and rural buildings, fences, waterholes, barns, silos, housing for staff and workers, 
and others that although are also attache to the land, their rates of depreciation are much 
higher than those for the extraordinary improvements, and they have been introduced by 
their specific purpose which is to develop of a rural activity. That is, without any intention 
to develop rural activity, these investments would not occur. For that reason they may be 
considered as a variable factor. Meanwhile, the substantially variable factors are the well-
known seeds, machinery, livestock, chemicals, fuel, rural labor, etc. 
 
                                               
10
 Certainly it could be possible to identify facilities and buildings, as a third factor, "quasi-fixed" or "cuasi-
variable"; but on purpose of the Ricardean distinction that is used and explained later on, is also convenient 
identify them as variables. 
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Taxation policy on rural sector should observed different treatment for each type of factor. 
The economic return of the fixed factor "land", which arises from the rural property (RP), 
should be levy differently, and separately of profitability or gain of "variables factors" that 
is gains arising from the rural activity (RA). 
 
Therefore, the main distinction to avoid mistakes is taxation design on rural sector, is to 
treat separately the fixed component (RP) and the variable component (RA), and in turn, 
acording with this distinction, it is appropriate to treat individuals operating in rural sector 
‘á la Ricardo’, that is: the owner (landlord) and the producer (capitalist). Ricardo in his 
work on the subject made a sharp distinction between the fixed and the variable factor. In 
his model, the rural sector is composed of those two types of economic agents. On one 
hand, the landowners, who are paid by the rent obtained from their land. This rent arises 
from differentials in productivity of lands, obtained both by the ‘extended margin’ 
(expansion of harvested acreage) or by the ‘intensive margin’, in the land use (marginal 
gain due to incremental investments on the acres occupied). On the other hand are farmers 
– the capitalists in Ricardian taxonomy - who through the use of the variables factors 
capital and labor, operate the rural productive activity. Perfect competition among 
capitalists, demanding land for leasing, makes this sector gets only normal profits for the 
investment. Any eventual extra-gain greater than normal, either due to agricultural prices 
increases, by reduction in agricultural inputs prices, by technological improvements in land 
exploitation, or for any other reason, will not be accrued to normal gains of capitalist 
agents. Due to the mobility and competitive access of capitalists searching to maximize the 
return on their investment, all increase in rural commodities performance will be 
completely transferred to the owners of the fixed factor - the rural landowners - through the 
increase in rent or leases that in that competitive scenario would occur.  
 
But in the current organization of rural sector, in fact there is not such a sharp Ricardian 
separation. At present, owners sometimes decide to rent their land to contractors or tenants, 
the "capitalists" by Ricardo, but sometimes landowners decide to exploit their own land, 
that is, in addition to be owners,  also choose be capitalists. 
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However, despite the hybrid status of our rural organization, in the taxation design is 
convenient to maintain the separation of Ricardian view precisely in order not to make 
conceptual errors as mentioned above. Any economic return that arises from the RP should 
pay a tax, while profitability that arises from the RA should pay another tax of a different 
nature. This means that when an owner leases his land to a contractor or capitalist should 
pay a tax on land rent (which is what justifies leasing). Furthermore, the contractor or 
capitalist should pay a tax due to profitable rural activity, that is, on the gain obtained after 
paying the cost of leasing to owner. If the owner operates his or her own land, would be 
acting in two roles. One, as landowner, and must to pay a tax on land rent, as if he had paid 
the land lease to himself. The other, as a rural producer and he must pay taxes associated to 
that rural activity, that is, the net gain after deducing the cost of the land rent, on which he 
or she would have already paid the tax, as RP. 
 
Why is it important the distinction between RP and RA? It is important at least for two 
reasons. First, because in case of RP, the tax should levy the land rent, that is, the "fixed 
and not reproducible factor" (land), whereas in case of RA, the tax should levy gains 
obtained by the use of variable factors. Through a tax on value land or Rural Real Estate 
Tax (RPT), of the type a "tax on land free of improvements" (TLFI), the Government will 
absorb a portion of the rent of the land factor without affecting incentives for their use, 
which means without causing excess burden. Besides, optimum taxation criterion suggests 
that tax should be also relatively fixed, that is, not levy tax on the short term land rent - 
relatively volatil - but levy a tax on the potential long term of land rent. This type of tax, 
induces to lease or operate land efficiently, so as to obtain the highest possible rent; so this 
type of tax is compatible with the best productive use of land factor.11  By contrast, in case 
of taxing gains obtained from the use of variable factors, such as the Income Tax, it is 
optimal to tax income in proportion to the effective gains. These factors are mobile in the 
economy and it should be taxed as they are in all other economic activities.  
                                               
11
 As it will be discussed later on, the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice, while considering tax confiscation, 
mentioned that the tax base of reference for measuring confiscation of a rural real estate tax should be the 
actual market value of land, or the potential rent of the property exploited "diligently”. This form of taxation 
on land value relatively fixed - taxing the long-term potential of land rent - does not exclude the possibility of 
schemes of tax payments linked to major changes in annual, current or effective land rents, not only through 
"sporadic plans", allowing reductions or deferment of payments through ocasional policy decisions, but also 
through "automatic plans" (that is, through policy decisions designed as permanent "rule"). 
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Second, if land rent and capital gains are summed up for tax base determination of a tax 
(like the Income tax), the tax leads to double taxation. Actually, the Rural Property Tax in 
many Argentine provinces is a tax on the rent of land – or a tax on land value that is the 
same – but in many cases they also levy the tax on ordinary investments (that is, the land 
improvement is also included in the tax base), while the national level of government, 
levies a tax on profits of Rural Activity, through the Income Tax. So, in some provinces, 
taxation on Rural Property levy a tax on sunk investment in ordinary improvements of land 
- that is the same that taxing the economic return from equity applied to the rural activity 
(double taxation) -. In turn, the national Income Tax - in cases of confluence of the RP and 
RA in the same person (natural or legal) - can not avoid to levy the tax on land rent and 
earnings of capital invested in the AR at the same time (double taxation). The Income Tax 
legislation only allows labor cost deduction. That is, the land rent is taxed differently and 
separately for both levels of government. This double taxation could be avoided through 
allowing the deduction of a "presumptive lease", like a self-payment of a leasing acting as 
producer (RA).12 
 
Of course that avoiding double taxation on rent and income from sunk investments in rural 
properties will necessarily require an agreement between levels of government (national 
and provincial), so the Rural Property Tax would not levy a tax on land improvements, and 
the national Income Tax would allow the deduction of the lease (the effectively paid in the 
case of a capitalist, or the "presumptive lease" in the case of a landlord-capitalist), the same 
way that the Income Tax in Argentina allows to deduce from the tax base dividends of 
shareholders, avoiding double taxation on capital. 
 
However, it is clear that the private property of land could be affected by the consolidated 
fiscal policy, as a result of all tax policies adopted separately by levels of governments 
(national, provincial and municipal). Because all taxes on land - even avoiding double 
                                               
12
 In some countries, like Brazil, income tax law allows companies to make a deduction for the opportunity 
cost of capital invested in order to taxable income determination. This measure attempts to avoid bias against 
financing through own capital or fraudulent simulation of the financing structure with the use of credit or 
debt, that is, to avoid the problem of "thin capitalization". 
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taxation as already suggested - will affect the land market value; that is, no matter what tax 
or set of taxes on the RP and the result of the RA, would exist.13  
 
Reduction of land value is synonymous of reduction of the net present value of the private 
land rent. Therefore, the value of land depends on the level of tax burden on it, either 
directly through the Rural Property Tax or a Personal Property Tax, or indirectly through 
the Income Tax, Tax on Exports, or by a Gross Turn Over Tax (Ingresos Brutos). Each tax 
will capture a portion of land rent and the consolidated may lead to a tax burden that finally 
becomes confiscatory, or not depending obviously on its level. This topic is analyzed next. 
 
d) Taxing rural rent and confiscation  
 
Tax confiscation has been always of concern of tax experts (accountants, lawyers, jurists, 
constitutionalists, economists). But in the case of the factor "land", the property right has 
been discussed mostly in a different political scenario relative to the rest of activities and/or 
real and financial resources. The eternal discussion recognizes an especial concern respect 
private ownership of land. The domain of a non-reproducible resource, necessary for living 
to any individual, and linked to this characteristic, the ethical-religious conception of land 
with the original attribute of a "natural right" for its use, has lead many times to support the 
principle of a "common right" for use of all humanity.  
 
However, it is clear that discussion about private property right or public property of land 
finally becomes irrelevant, since no matter the possible constitutional arrangements 
(recognition of private property or public ownership) ultimately the Government will 
always exercise the "effective domain", even though from the purely formal or legal side, 
constitutions sustain the principle of “private ownership right”. The effective control of 
Government can come about simply through expropriating land, or indirectly "recognizing 
private property" but taxing the land rent to unreasonably high levels.   
 
                                               
13
 The next section will explain in detail this important aspect of rural taxation.  
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What is the difference of the tax burden and confiscatory taxation on land relative to tax 
burden on other factors of production? Precisely that the land is not tradable, and is not 
reproducible. Variable factors can avoid the confiscatory effect in the long term, though 
suffering a confiscatory tax in the short term. Simply due to the mobility of variable 
factors, through regional and sectoral reallocations  - in a free crossing borders scenario - 
the private owners can escape from the Leviathan effect of the Government, while 
landlords shall suffer the respective expropriation of their land without any possibility of 
"voting with their feet" (Tiebout).14  
 
For this reason, discussion on tax confiscation affecting land value becomes highly 
relevant, not only from the economic point of view but also legal and political, because 
ultimately the only limit to taxation seems to be only "the law"; there would not exist an 
economic limit. However, in rural land case: what type of reference can help to define the 
level of tax burden that may be defined as confiscatory? Let's review the two approaches: 
the legal approach and the economic approach. 
 
From a legal point of view, the Constitution of Argentina protects property right by 
prohibiting the confiscation of property (Art. 14 and 17).15 The Supreme Court 
jurisprudence also has sustained that confiscation is verified when tax burden goes beyond 
33 per cent of property value or its rent (which is the same). Within that line, the supreme 
magistrates have insisted that "this pattern" (the 33%) has been recognized repeatedly by 
the Court, so confiscation occurs in all cases where the tax burden exceeds the prescribed 
percentage.16  
                                               
14
 For a similar reason, the sunk investment in rural property could also suffer the expropriation. 
15
 Article 14: All the inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights under the laws that regulate their 
exercise, namely....... "Use and dispose of their property”.... Article 17: Property is inviolable and no 
inhabitant of the Nation can be deprived thereof except by sentence based on law.... "The confiscation of 
property is hereby abolished forever from the Argentine Criminal Code. No armed body may make 
requisitions nor demand assistance of any kind”. 
16
 The Supreme Court of the Nation in many cases and in various issues established the tax rate beyond which 
tax law violates the constitutional principle of non-confiscation. This limit was always set at 33% (see bug: 
209:114, 210:310 and 125/126, 320, recital 6° among many others). The ceiling of 33% in the tax burden is 
the one that fixed the Argentine Supreme Court with its present composition explicitly in the famous ruling 
"Vizzoti, Carlos A. C/AMSA SA s/dismissal" in November 4, 2004, that capped the cut of the tax basis for 
compensation of labor dismissal, contemplated by art. 245 of Argentine Labor Contract Law. However, in a 
most recent jurisprudence - July/03/2009, Pronouncement C. 866. 42. Candy SA c/AFIP and other s/judicial 
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That is, when the tax burden exceeds the indicated limit, applied on "real value of assets” - 
which equals the present value of the private rent generated by them - property rights 
would be altered in substance; in rural sector case, covering the domain, land leasing, 
and/or all products that land produces. 
 
However the clearness of the recent Court jurisprudence about the limit of confiscation, 
which “is not absolute but variable in time and circumstances”, dealing with taxation 
burden should be recognized  that there is a close relationship between the State of Law 
and constitutional guarantee to private property as an institution. The abuse of the taxing 
power of government can demolish the State of Law and jeopardize the private property 
right, pushing society toward collectivism. The attribute of confiscatory of any tax is 
independent of its economic purpose, and the injustice committed by any taxation on assets 
or incomes of any person, produces an economic damage that should always be repaired. 
This is guaranteed not only by art. 17 of the Constitution, which guarantees private 
property right, and by art. 18 that prohibits confiscation as penalty, or that any armed force 
                                                                                                                                            
protection in relation to inflation adjustment in balance sheets - the Court has pointed out that the limit of the 
tax burden is not absolute but variable in time and circumstances (Judgments: 314:1293; 322: 3255), and 
that the criterion for judging the tax burden and its rationality can not be tightly uniform for all cases in orden 
to declare a tax as confiscatory or not, "... it is not enough consider the tax rate but also other reasons relative 
to taxation matters, the timing of its implementation or its impact, and so on, which is a matter of study by the 
Congress within the constrain of the constitutional guarantees "(Judgments: 160:247). However, in the same 
vein, the Court has established that due to changing circumstances in the country - even under the same 
circumstances - the different link of certain kind of taxes with general welfare, derived from the type of 
wealth or taxable activity, or from the direct or indirect taxpayer, and the country where the wealth has 
located or where the gain has been obtained, may justify that the limits vary more or less. Except for the case 
in which the amount of the tax burden behaves virtually as the annihilation of property in their substance or in 
any of its attributes, the limit is not absolute but relative, variable in time, and even capable of differentiation 
at the same time (Judgments: 210:1208; see also Judgments: 210:855). It should be remembered also that 
since many years ago and in certain matters, the Court ruled the famous 33% as the ceiling for the tax burden, 
limit beyond which art. 17 of the Constitution would be affected, “but this limit could not be erected... as a 
rigid parameter ...” (see paragraph 25, majority vote in Judgments: 318:676). In particular, and only as an 
example, it is noted that this pattern was maintained always in real estate taxation (Judgments: 196:122, 
209:114 and 200; 210:172 and 310; 220:322, 236: 22) and yet it has been based on very specific requirements 
for determining the value on which that proportion o rate would be calculated, such as considering the real 
value of the property or the productive, normal or potential value, according to a rational exploitation of it and 
not its administrative or cadastral assessed value, (Judgments: 239:157; 314:1293 and appointments 
322:3255, among others). Also came up to that rule in the case of the inheritance tax (Bugs: 234:129, 
235:883), dealing with the provincial tax levying on fees earned in court (Judgments: 220:699); finally, the 
contribution of improvements, if it is slightly exceeds 33% of property value after the improvement 
(Judgments: 210:351). At least but not last, for comments about Candy versus AFIP see Teijeiro and Ballone 
(2009). 
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can make requisitions neither demand assistance of any kind, but also by the 
“reasonableness guarantee”, that emerges from art. 28 of the Argentine Constitution.17 
 
Although depth discussion of the legal issue is obviously beyond the scope of this 
document - the author acknowledges his professional weakness in this area - some 
additional comments about a possible conflict in the very common statement of the 
Supreme Court that justice can not "play politics", deserves a mention. About this usual 
point of view, an obvious question arises: in which way should be defined the institutional 
mechanism to determine the “reasonableness” of a tax, and determining whether it violates 
property or not, diferent to “making politics”? The Justice will not resolve the problem by 
arguing that a trial is politically complicated, corresponding to Congress the attribute of 
how to define trade policy, exchange policy, fiscal policy linked to provision of public 
goods, problems of income redistribution policies, etc. Trials in Supreme Court, 
complicated or not, being a consequence of Congress decision or not, must be resolved by 
Judges when they arise at that instance. It seems that the problem of Justice, at least in 
recent years in Argentina, is to wield a careful attitude in order “to avoid political decisions 
making” or “not judicialize politics”, arguing that “to define policies is a function of the 
Congress”. So in Argentina seems to be of no concern to the Justice, for example, people 
protesting and cutting streets or roads with police acquiescence (in any case actually 
“legitimized” by the government). It seems that Court neglects to recognize that Justice is 
an institution whose existence responds to the republican regime of government, which 
therefore constitutes a “constitutional power” and so is also part of Government. "Policy 
decisions" through the Justice are necessary every time Constitution is violated. In the 
present case, this is so because the justification for the existence of a tax does not depend 
solely on the opinion of Congressmen, no matter how good, appropriate, timely and well-
intentioned from any point of view – economic or social – could be qualified the taxation 
law drafted by Congress; even supported by opinion of economists awarded with Nobel 
Prizes - just because what it is set out by Article 28 of the Argentine Constitution.18 
                                               
17
 “Art. 28. The principles, guarantees and rights recognized in the preceding sections shall not be altered by 
laws that regulate their enforcement”. 
18
 The justification of a tax law can not be based solely on grounds of economic efficiency arguments 
(gain/loss of welfare by encouraging or discouraging the taxed activity not offset by deteriorations or 
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Why then the author was encouraged by the idea of trying to find out a guideline for 
allowing judges could set out a clearest parameter to define the limit of confiscatory 
taxation? Because the argument ratified by the Court in Candy SA v / AFIP that 33% 
would not be a strict limit because the limit is subject to conditions "variable in time and in 
circumstances", generates an scenery of extraordinary level of uncertainty, and probably 
destruction or non-viability of many large investment projects - particularly those in long-
term maturity - which is incompatible with a free market system and private ownership to 
operate efficiently. Moreover, if Supreme Court in future trials due to changed 
circumstances decides that such a limit reaches 66% - double the famous 33% - would be 
legislating retroactively on tax burden, affecting private property rights and unrecoverable 
investment. This would contradict the constitutional principle that requires the existence of 
tax legislation in advance to the economic decision that will be afterwards taxed. So, fixing 
a new limit of confiscation should not be subject to future discretions in which changes of 
the 33% parameter were relatively important. 
 
In conclusion, generate a suggestion that could help judges to limit or narrow the definition 
of the constitutional guarantees dealing with “the reasonableness of taxation” on the rural 
sector, whatever the policy decided by the Congress is the aim for a possible contribution 
of this document. 
 
However, it is clear that Supreme Court jurisprudence has not discussed about the tax 
confiscation due to “consolidated tax burden”, that is, cumulative of all taxes levied 
directly or indirectly the land property and affecting its value. The land value could be 
affected by a tax on land property - as the real state tax - or taxes on production or income 
it generates, as the tax on gross turn over tax (Ingresos Brutos), tax on exports, the income 
tax, etc. Anyway, any tax on the activity performed with the use of land as dominant factor 
                                                                                                                                            
improvements generated in the rest of the economy) or on distributional equity reason (income 
redistribution policy as a public good or as a merit good) (see Bour, E., 2008, 2009, Chapter XV, on this 
topic). No matter the justifications that literature has recognized in land taxation (see Stiglitz, 1987), the 
design of economic policy faces a typical "conditionated optimization problem" - which forces policy 
makers to achieve a “second best”- and in which one of the operating restriction is the “confiscatory level 
of taxing power”, no matter the objective function to optimizing. 
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of the production, end up affecting the residual payment to landowners (the land rent or 
land leasing) due to tax-amortization effect on land value. Figures 1 and 2 explain this 
important aspect of the study.19 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
             MLPV; P         Fix land supply 
   
              Capitalist     
                         surplus        P1             Land price before Real state Tax 
                 Real state            Derived demand for land                         
             P2         Tax              Realstate tax rate 
            Landowner              Private                      Land price after Real state Tax 
           surplus 20            Rent              SOCIAL LAND RENT                         
   
   0    Q*        Q 
 
 
Notes: 
MLPV: marginal land productivity value 
P: land price 
Q: acres 
SOCIAL LAND RENT = Real state Tax + Private Rent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19
 In Appendix 1 you will find a formal description of this point. 
20
 The Real state Tax affects the landowner surplus (implies instant “tax-amortization”), regardless if land 
is leased or operated by landowner direct administration. 
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Figure 2 
 
MLPV; P           Fix land supply 
   
                         Capitalist     
                          surplus                        
          P1          Land price before Tax on RA 
        
                  Taxation           Derived demand for land without Tax on RA                  
           on Rural      
                Activities          
             P2                                        Land price after Tax on RA 
                         Landowner          Social and        Derived demand for land with Tax on RA  
  surplus                         
              Private Rent   SOCIAL LAND RENT                       
                            
               0     Q*        Q 
 
Notes: 
MLPV: marginal land productivity value 
P: land price 
Q: acres 
SOCIAL LAND RENT = Private Land Rent 
 
The abscissa, both in Figure 1 and in Figure 2, measures acres of land of certain quality (or 
fertility) and Q* the available acres or farm size. The ordinate axis measures the marginal 
productivity value of land (derived demand for land), where the negative slope takes 
account of diminishing marginal returns in land exploitation.21 
 
The integral of the demand curve in the range 0-Q* expresses the gross social value of the 
exploitation of available land, that can be split between the “surplus” that the capitalist 
appropriates and the “social land rent” accountable to the use of the fix resource land (the 
area below the line indicating the price of an acre of land before taxes). The level or height 
from the abscissa axis of the derived land demand curve depends on the type of land or 
quality of soil; a better quality means higher altitude level from the abscissa axis. An 
                                               
21
 This assumption is not crucial for the economic analysis posed here; it is possible to assume constant 
returns, in which case the demand curve for land would be a flat-derived demand curve, parallel to the 
abscissa axis, indicating that there is no surplus for the capitalist or demander for land. However, from the 
economic and legal point should be necessary to clarify something more regarding land improvements. 
This aspect will be analyzed later while discussing the possible benchmark for land value determination. 
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increased height of the curve belonging of one property over another, will thus indicates the 
existence of an differential rent due to fertility or location of the former relative the latter 
(therefore of lesser aptitude). It may also be due to the effect of increased investment in 
improvements (tillage modern technology, fertilization, etc.), which increases the benefit 
obtain from the rural activity on the property, generating a differential land rent due to 
intensive margin. Linked to this, it is important to assume that technology used in the 
exploitation of rural property correspond to “frontier technology”, depending to the present 
state of arts.22 
 
Figure 1 shows the incidence of a Real Estate Tax - Tax on Land Free of Improvement 
(TLFI) - by which the government captures a part of the social land rent (SR) and the 
"private rent of land" (PR) obtained by landowner; and, Figure 2 shows how any other tax 
burden on rural activity (RA) – levying a tax on production costs or on the sale price of 
rural products - also reduces the net rent of land received by private landowners, moving 
down the derived demand for land. 
 
Figure 1 also shows that a tax on land rent - such as a TLFI or a “normal potential land rent 
tax” - does not affect the level of gross social land rent obtained before and after tax. For 
that reason the derived demand curve for land remains unchanged after the appearance of 
the TLFI. That’s why tax burden on rural property through a direct tax like the TLFI, 
means a non-distorting tax, that is, it doesn’t change the level of rural production, while tax 
burden on the use of variable factors, like a "gross turn over tax" (Ingresos Brutos) or a tax 
on exports, affect production and the social land rent. TLFI would only have distributive 
effects through the appropriation of social land rent (the government partially socializes the 
land rent, and lets the difference be appropriated by the private landowner). 
 
Figure 2 shows that a distortionary tax levying on inputs or production cost and/or on the 
value or the price after tax of rural products, brings down the derived demand curve for 
                                               
22
 This assumption guarantees judges that land rent is attributable to the present estate of arts which links to 
the concept of a “normal potential land rent” which could be achieved working productively. 
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land, which means a decrease of the social land rent and a similar reduction of the private 
land rent, appropriated by landlord, while capitalist surplus remains unchanged.23 
 
In conclusion, the difference between the two types of taxation is that a TLFI does not 
reduce social land rent, simply reduces its appropriation by landlord, i.e. reduces the private 
rent; the rest is socialized by the government. But a tax on RA not only reduces private rent 
appropriated by landowner, it also reduces social rent. In case of combining a tax levied on 
the use of inputs, or a withholding tax on sales, the capitalist must be paid anyway 
according with the opportunity cost of variables factors labor and capital, which means a 
lower rent value attributable to rural production and a consequent lower level of rent for 
landowners (backward shifting of tax burden or incidence). If tax burden on rural activities 
goes on increasing, the derived demand for land will continue falling (moving down) and, 
eventually, cause an excess supply of land, i.e. the demand for land would be less than the 
total available acres of land (would reduce the extensive margin of land factor use). The 
derived demand curve for land will continue descending, reaching the abscissa at some 
point - on the left of Q* - showing at that moment the existence of idle land, and tending to 
zero the property value.24 
 
The reader can imagine another diagram including the two types of taxes simultaneously. 
The result is that both – the consolidated tax burden - will affect the “residual rent of land" 
for landlord - after paying the opportunity cost before taxes of the other factor (capital and 
labor) - causing a sharp drop in the market value of land.. 
 
So, it is clear that both types of taxation - a direct or indirect tax burden on rural activity 
and, consequently all taxes: state-provincial taxes (like a TLFI and any type of sales 
                                               
23
 The integral of the derived demand curve for land between the abscissa intervals 0 and Q* measures the 
gross social value of rural farm production and clearly shows a higher value in the case of TLFI (which 
does not change the level of that curve after tax). While the integral of the derived demand curve for land, 
in the same range 0-Q*, of a distortion tax, shifted down that curve. As capitalist surplus will not change, 
the result is a lower social rent attributable to land factor of production. For further explanation of this topic 
see Appendix 2. 
24
 If the derived demand for land is assumed parallel to the abscissa (constant costs in the use of the 
variable factors), reaching the abscissa level, land would be totally put out of production and property value 
would be zero. See Appendix 2 for extensions. 
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provincial tax, etc.), the national taxes (Tax on Exports, Corporate Income Tax, etc.), and 
the local or municipal taxes (like the Tax for Maintenance of Road Network) are 
“amortized” in land value, and the consolidated tax burden could lead to a scenario of 
confiscation.25 
 
Finally, if social rent of land is totally expropriated by government, i.e., if government 
reduces private rent of land to zero, will lead land market value to zero. In this case, and 
despite the usual "normative welfare approach" which supports that “social rent of land ” 
will anyhow survive, it is natural to expect that there will be no incentive for the landowner 
to make his land produce.26 Let us clarify this point: why with "private rent of land" equal 
to zero can be expected that there will be no incentive for the landowner to lease land or 
assume the risk of direct exploitation of his land? The normative welfare approach argues 
this way: if the social rent of land is greater than the cost of rewarding the variable factors 
or the opportunity cost of labor and capital, a capitalist (tenant) will be certainly willing to 
pay a leasing with the equivalent difference between sales value less those costs (the 
residual rent or the private rent of land). It is also true that if the owner does not lease his 
land, would face a huge loss, because he should pay the TLFI the government anyway.  On 
the other case, if a landlord-capitalist decides to run the rural activity directly, he will 
estimate the risk of his investment in the same manner as the tenant does, and the situation 
would then be equal, and the TLFI would be paid exactly with the difference o residual 
land rent after rewarding variable factors cost. If owners decide not to exploit their land 
could not avoid paying the TLFI anyway, consequently, would have to produce and get as 
much rent as possible. From this argument arises the premise that nothing would change in 
terms of incentives. But this is not really correct; let’s explain this point: 
 
(i) if land is given on lease, the landlord must be sure of achieving a minimum positive 
private rent for covering own risks – of relative unknown magnitude - depending on: 1) 
how the tenant make use of land (most notably the possible exhaustion of soil through 
organic components exhausting or a poor use of technology), and 2) losses in the collection 
                                               
25
 Appendix 3 provides a summary of recent author studies on tax burden measurements on the rural sector 
in Argentina, Piffano and D'Amore (2007) and, Piffano and Sturzenegger (2009). 
26
 Assuming a long-term scenario. 
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of rents (a circumstance that was lived in 2009 in cases of the deferred lease payment 
modality, due to the failure of the agriculture campaign caused by drought). These are two 
risks assumed by the owner (not by the tenant). That is, leasing land do not means “living 
on rent” without any efforts or without problems. A lease contract needs to be managed, 
and those risks need to be covered (insisting, not by the tenant but by the landowner). 
Experience indicates that there is no formal lease that can avoid them. Let’s remind once 
more that the residual rent is what any tenant or capitalist will be willing to pay after 
paying the variable factors, labor and capital, plus taxes, not more, so that the “residual 
social rent of land” determines how much money will remain for the landowner or for 
government (taxing directly land rent). But, even more, if the government absorbs all rent, 
the landowner could not survive, because even assuming that those risks do not exist the 
question is: on what income will allow to landlord and family, afford their living? The 
landowner would be the owner of a factor of production with a return equal zero! The rent 
of land property - the expected "positive future flow" of income to live on - from that 
moment on would not exist due to government confiscation. 
 
Is it possible to imagine a permanent economic scenario of this kind? Will the landowner 
put his land in production anyhow? There would not be any reaction to confiscation? From 
what source the landlord and his family will live from that moment on if the land rent is the 
only source of income? 
 
(ii) if the land is exploited directly by the landlord-capitalist, differential costs usually arise 
relative to the ones of tenants or contractors (pools) due to economies of scale (the use and 
access to modern technology, bulk or wholesale purchases of inputs, risk diversification in 
terms of regions and product structure, etc.). In this case landowner would not face the risk 
of land predation (land misuse), or at least depend on his decision to avoid it or not, but 
must assume that differential cost relative to contractors. If government captures the full 
social rent, measured by the potential lease value of land, the producer or capitalist-
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landowner could not cover this differential cost.27 The only solution could be to fix a TLFI 
of lesser burden on this type of exploitation. But a TLFI with a different tax burden for 
each type of operating system would most likely be affected by fraudulent conducts or 
maneuvers, administratively very difficult to avoid. 
 
In both cases, therefore, recognition of a private positive rent above the TLFI is required to 
prevent the net loss and ensure a minimum income for subsistence of landowners. Of 
course, if land is not being efficiently used losses would be even higher; because owner 
would have to pay anyhow the TLFI. But then the question that arises is how to imagine in 
the long term a permanent net loss and lack of income to survive for landowners? 
 
The landlord could not keep on working on rural activity for long, because he would be 
working either in administering a lease, or as a "private agent" producing for the exclusive 
benefit of the government with a net loss and without income at sight. Then, the 
landowners will face a scenario of slavery, where it is not clear what income source shall 
finance their life. Probably they will decide to throw to trash their property titles, go abroad 
and thus avoiding any net loss and pay nothing to the government. Indirect expropriation or 
abandonment of lands would be observed. If Justice would not exist or would not appear 
the alternative to land abandonment would likely be a violent conflict. 
 
Supporting this argument, Enrique Bour in his commentary, while suggesting that this 
paper should advance a set of essential attributes to consider in the design of rural taxation, 
rather than being concerned exclusively with the problem of the quantitative tax limit for 
confiscation,28 as first principle or essential attribute points out: “Security in property 
rights: farmers shall produce if they do not fear an arbitrary land confiscation. 
Entrepreneurs and inventors will not develop new products if they have no property rights 
such as patents, trademarks and intellectual property rights. Property must be guaranteed 
                                               
27
 The landowners who would be most affected are those with fewer acres of land (and to some extent, with 
lower soil quality) who obtain rents at levels below to the “average land potential rent”. Go back to 
Appendices 1 and 2 for explanations. 
28
 Bour is thinking of a much larger work, such as being developed in the already mentioned Piffano and 
Sturzenegger (2009), but the aim of this paper is much more limited. 
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by a predictable rule or law enforcement against possible robbery form private or 
government organizations”. 
 
In conclusion, if landlords do not obtain any positive net private rent will have no 
motivation to make their land produce because they would not have any income to live on. 
In that case, if government want to keep on rural production, it may do it by “a direct and 
explicit act of land expropriation” – allowing other capitalists to exploit land for the 
government, with paying it the full lease (land rent) - or by an “indirect act of expropriation 
forcing owners or farmers to produce anyway”.29 
 
Now, without going to an Stalinist extremes full expropriation scenario, the relevant 
question for any capitalist country that respects or guarantees property rights and freedom 
of individuals, is: what could be the benchmark to identify the “reasonable bracket" to tax 
burden on the value of land - or the present value of private rent, which is the same - that 
legitimize a land rent to private landowners avoiding confiscation? Is there any “economic 
parameter" that may help answer this question? 
                                               
29
 It would reiterate the historical phenomenon of the kulaks or small farmers who did own land in Ukraine. 
Stalin did not want to expropriate their land, but he wanted to capture the land rent, so as to force farmers to 
live as "serfs of the glebe". The farmers who exploited the land of their ancestors resisted, being denigrated 
and stripped of the fruits of their labor. They objected strenuously to turn over the cattle and corn from their 
lands. They organized resistance, hiding crops in underground silos protected with cloth with tar and tarred 
roads blocked to prevent the looting of their products. This infuriated the tyrant Stalin who decided to use 
brute force and unleashed a violent propaganda campaign against the country accusing them of being 
selfish, rich oligarchs, subversives and enemies of the Soviet people. He could not initially send the Red 
Army to suppress them because at that time were spread across a multitude of small places and the Red 
Army would be drained in an endless series of tiny battles. Then organized shock troops made up of 
militias led by political commissars. But he also ordered to starve Ukraine farmers. He began by accusing 
them of violating an absurd law that established as serious criminal offenses: a) providing false information 
in affidavits, b) sell smuggled cereals and oilseeds, c) eat a particular stock of self production, d) resist the 
delivery of production to government, e) refusing to plant or harvest the products demanded by the 
government. The measures were on the rise. He seized all agricultural production and livestock based on 
the argument that by this way secured the supply of urban populations. In the documented work of 
Stéphane Courtuois (Director) (1997), may be found hundreds of terrifying photographs (from 1932 to 
1933) where almost ten million people were deported to concentration camps in Siberia, killing a third part 
of them. Facing the Soviet propaganda and irrational battle many rebel kulaks even killing local political 
authorities. But success of farmers was short lasting. The Red Army led by political commissars was finally 
sent to drown the agrarian revolt. The GPU secret police launched a terror campaign to bring down the 
morale of the rebels. When local communist party leaders, sent massages to Stalin begging for a little 
leniency, the tyrant responded ordering them to exterminate those leaders with the firing squad, and turned 
up Ukraine into a huge concentration camp. (Margariti, 2008). 
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Later a proposal to answer that question is suggested, but previously is necessary to make 
new clarification.30 
 
Certainly, the justification of the jurisprudence of the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice 
on the confiscatory level of taxation of 33% was the “reasonableness”,  based on the 
subjective viewpoint of judges, which according the decision upheld by the Court would be 
anyhow “variable in time and the circumstances”, a particularly important aspect as already 
were commented. In fact, how to distribute the land rent would be considered as a policy 
decision, outside the scope within which Justice and also the economic theory could 
provide "optimal" solutions in its allocation, and the decision will depend on which is the 
distributive justice criterion sustained in policy desing. 
 
On that vision, it seems that any proposed expropriation of land (or land rent) with a tax 
essentially non-distortive, as the TLFI - would not have any economic significance - and 
therefore would not need to be particularly studied by economists - because there's no harm 
in a pure economic sense with expropriation; it will not affect the supply of land, and 
consequently will not affect production (there is no excess burden). Porto in his critique 
reminds that the second welfare theorem, in its most raw and pure definition, shows that 
property transferences make redistributions possible without affecting incentives; and, 
models "à la Henry George" and his proposal of a "single tax", where the public 
expenditure is just equal to the land rent, levied with this single no distortive tax. 
 
However, we disagree with the "pure" welfare approach at least for two reasons:  
 
First, in an open economy with perfect factor mobility between countries, any compulsory 
property transference and/or any attempt to reduce prices of variable factors (labor and 
capital) below their reserve values,  will affect incentives (input supplies), precisely due to 
mobility.31 In the case of land, according to welfare approach, this will not happen, because 
                                               
30
 The author must thank Alberto Porto for his first criticism to a very preliminary version of this document 
that induced to make this additional explanation. 
31
 In a general equilibrium model “à la Bator” it is possible to identify the "optimum optimorum solution" 
through “lump sum transfers”, which given the assumption of "fixed factors' supply" can not obviously by 
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the supply of land is fixed, i.e., land can not cross borders. However, such attitude of 
confiscation or expropriation by government, very clearly will affect the "sovereign risk" of 
a country showing signs of not respecting property rights and the possibility that 
expropriations may go on beyond land. The evolution of spreads of sovereign risk rates 
among Southern Cone countries shows the incidence of the conflict between Argentine 
government and rural sector in 2008, in its attempt to expropriate a higher land rent. The 
Argentine sovereign risk was later in 2008 damaged once again, by government's 
expropriation of private saving funds from private pension administrations (AFJP). That is, 
a government that shows many expropriating decisions - very unpredictable but at the same 
time regular - affect the incentives very seriously.32 
 
Henry George was right...levy a single tax (no distortive), why to levying another tax 
affecting the activity level? But the small detail of this suggestion is that is a socialist 
concept that not even respects the constitutional taxation principle in Argentina of 
individuals’ equality - no matter if they are landowners, capitalists or ordinary workers 
without capital or without land - in paying the burden of taxes, and not compatible with the 
property right principle. If the scenario within which this issue must be analyzed is that of a 
capitalist system (which respects the rights of private property), any economic decision 
faces the question of how to maximize social welfare subject to the restriction of not 
confiscation. For a socialist country would be a second best that could be avoided, for a 
liberal or capitalist country that recognizes private property right, namely that recognizes 
the value of land that landowners had paid at the time of purchase, is a simple robbery 
when burden is higher than the legal limit (the restriction of the optimization model), that 
                                                                                                                                            
definition register any economic agents response, in terms of incentives in the supply of factors. Economic 
policy in such a simple model can introduce a social welfare function that identifies a point on the utility 
possibility frontier, with specific implications with respect to ensuring certain levels of welfare of each 
person and a specific Pareto-optima’s configuration in the economy (and, only one production structure and 
unique relative prices between goods and factors of production). Certainly this type of model is not valid to 
an open economy with free mobility of factors and, consequently, the policy result is innocuous to any 
attempt to confiscate property of resources, which will remain fixed regardless of any legal scenario 
(privately property or publicly owned), and either to the implications over their relative prices. 
32
 Unfortunately the governments behavior in Argentina have revealed repeated violations of properties and 
contracts (expropriations of large sunk investments, the public debt repudiation, confiscation of private 
savings, etc.) that have grown - in frequency and size - in the last two decades. The implications are clear - 
largely in decline in FDI and capital outflows – but the detail analysis of this issue is beyond the narrative 
of this document. 
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regardless of the legal question, will affect incentives. Now appears the question, which 
one may be the "reasonable legal limit” of tax burden for not giving signals of confiscation 
to the market? That's the question that this paper intends to answer. 
 
(ii) Once the separatist Ricardian concept - among rural landowner and capitalist - is 
accepted, all landlords who live on from rent of land - beyond any additional income 
obtained as an entrepreneur - will be affected by the governmental attitude which could be 
perceived confiscatory by the rural sector. That perception may or may not be related to the 
parameter fixed by the Supreme Court jurisprudence. In fact the tax burden on the 
landowners in Argentina has been increasing in the last decade; however, was political, 
legal and economically tolerated until the dictation of the now "suspended" famous 
Resolution 125, which implied a price ceiling or a fixed price for any possible future 
increase in all agricultural commodity prices.33 Basically the resolution implied a 
maximized level of expropriation of land rent by the government, without contemplating 
possible future increases in the cost of rural inputs. The uncertainty generated in rural 
activity was at that moment very important. 34 
 
The conflict between government and rural sector generated enormous economic cost, i.e. 
when the market perceived the confiscation and the high uncertainty scenario being 
created, economic agents and public in general reacted politically generating enormous 
social costs (in terms of excess burden, and revenues' losses in many activities due to 
conflict). So the welfare theorem - far from considering the institutional and political 
implications that a positive approach however could anticipate – is not enough as "recipe" 
to solve the real economic problem in any economy. 
 
                                               
33
 The resolution fixed a dynamic system of tax on export with a progressive tax rate structure, linked to the 
international commodities prices.  
34
 See AACREA (2008). During 2007 and until the endorsement of the cited “Resolution 125”, the 
agricultural and industrial activities, and the entire country, had been benefited from the sustained rise in 
international commodity prices, so increases in the tax on exports rate (retenciones) from 10% in 2002 to 
the ones that was fixed in early 2008 (35% for soybean) were assimilated by the rural sector without 
creating any further conflict. As Daniel Artana said in his comment, political reaction to the R.125 
accumulated not only the perception of confiscation of the land rent from landowners, but also of the sunk 
capital costs by capitalists in rural activities. 
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Perhaps it is not necessary to recall here to Friedrich A. von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises 
to highlight the importance of markets and their functioning in terms of economic 
efficiency. Nor adding contributions of the literature on “law-economics” and authors like 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock with its “economy of constitutions”, and all the 
literature on institutional economics that explores the effects of good or poor 
implementation of public policies on resource allocation, including attempts of 
redistribution of income that will affect the incentives, depending on how these policies are 
perceived by the market (consumers, capitalists, landowners, workers or employers). 
 
Precisely when perceptions of economic agents through the markets - when they observe or 
anticipate changes in relative prices and on income earning opportunities from their activity 
- are considered important, a direct way for find out an answer to the original question of 
the paper on the "economic perception" on a possible limit of confiscation of land rent, is 
simply observing what the "land markets” say about it. 
 
The answer to the question about which could be the reference or benchmark to set a legal 
limit to tax burden for confiscation of the land rent; the level that could produced harmful 
effects on economic activities and generates social conflicts, and whether there is an 
"economic parameter" that can help for answer that question, engender a first reaction that 
quickly comes to mind: the old recommendation of Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1661/1665), - 
Minister of Finance under Louis XIV of France, collected by the literature. Colbert said: 
“L'art de l'imposition is l'oie à plume pour obtenir le plus possible de plumes avant 
d'obtenir le moins possible de cris”- “The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose 
to obtain the largest possible amount of feathers with the least cry hissing”-. But this 
ingenious recommendation, addressed to the policy makers very eager to get money and 
not so concerned about the productive consequence of their policy decisions, let everybody 
free to choose “the level of the goose's hissing” of the Colbert reference. Moreover, 
governments can go ahead despite the goose hissing. Actually, a more objective alarm 
reference of goose's hissing - indicative of rent confiscation from the economic standpoint - 
can be provided by land market.  That is, the answer can be found in a comparative analysis 
of lands value in the capitalist world, corresponding to lands with similar quality, same 
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aptitude or same productive potential level of agricultural commodities production, and 
belonging to countries with similar institutional characteristics and economic/productive 
profile comparable to Argentina.35 We will return to this proposal in the next point. 
 
Finally, recalling opinions from Alberto Porto, and also from Ricardo Lopez Murphy 
who suggests that "the level of taxation is a question of values”, and Martin Krause that 
“taxation has to be sufficient to pay expenditure. But, what expenditure?”...“There is no 
objective criterion that the economy can provide about what the state should do. Then we 
are back to political philosophy...” Actually, from political economy point of view is very 
important that economists can identify through market data the level of respect for private 
property of any country in the concert of capitalist nations. The governments' fiscal 
behavior, can explain different levels in land values. Anyhow, the benchmark will finally 
be fixed and will be judged in a range that only policy makers, judges, and naturally 
citizens who through the vote should be able to guide on the level of spending mentioned 
by Krause. 
 
3) An approach to the benchmark 
 
a) Introduction  
 
The characteristic of land - a fixed factor and a non-tradable factor - may lead to think 
that land' values in different countries should not have any relationship. But this is not 
true, particularly in case of rural properties. The explanation is the same use of rural 
land in all countries producing commodities such as wheat, corn, soybeans or another 
crop, or used for cattle' breeding and fattening. The land will generate equal "land 
social rent", as residual benefit, after paying back services of the variable factors. As 
the variable factors have characteristics of being reproducible and spatially mobile, in 
                                               
35
 Reader should take into account the meaning of the expression “similar institutional characteristics”, i.e. 
no “constitutional characteristics”, because it is possible to make comparisons with Federal and also with 
Unitarian countries; all countries guarantying private property right and individual freedom. Dealing with 
land value, any tax levying land factor – through national or federal, provincial or state and municipal or 
local governments’ taxation – will affect land value no matter the political or constitutional scenario. 
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the global economy will converge to similar payments. So, it follows that in the case 
of lands with equal characteristics, the social residual land rent should also converge 
to similar values. 
 
But convergence of social rent values is not similar to equalization of absolute levels 
of market land values (of lands with similar productivity or equal original soil 
characteristic). The absolute differences that will be observed in market prices may be 
due to the following factors: 
 
(i) Location - and therefore differences in transport costs to the centers of 
demand for farm products -; differences that, however, is reasonable to be 
relatively stable at least in the medium term; and the Improvements or 
Investments. 
 
(ii) Tax burden differentials - taxes and subsidies – on rural sector; and, 
 
(iii) Sovereign risk (or Institutional quality) of each country. 
 
About these three determinants, let’s make a brief consideration of the third one, in 
honour to the anticipated critic by Daniel Artana - who mentioned the limited space 
devoted to institutional quality - and in particular by Martin Krause in the same 
direction. As already quoted, Krause notes that, to define if tax burden is confiscatory 
or not, it is essential some reference to the public expenditure side and warns of 
possible differences in political philosophy to adopt on the issue. “For many could be 
the idea of Robert Nozick, for others the one of John Rawls” says Krause and adds: 
“As in the meta-utopy of Nozick, I would like to live in a community with an insurance 
company, to supply me security and other services, which I could change at any time. 
Others will choose a welfare state. In fact, the Swedes give up 60% or 70% of their 
income, when they pay taxes to government, and they accept it (those who don’t are 
citizens of Monaco). And he adds finally: “People in Swedish surely may believe that 
taxes are confiscatory if they do not receive from the government what they want. In 
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Argentina we do not receive almost anything (the old phrase that we have to pay 
twice for education, etc.); and a tax burden above 15% may be considered 
confiscatory”. 
 
On Krause comments - that are correct – is necessary to explain that within the 
definition of "institutional quality" and "its measurement" should be considered the 
quality of services provided by governments. We are actually referring to a concept of 
"institutional quality" that would include quality indicators in justice, health, 
education, security, etc. So, finally, this variable (meaning the package of public 
goods provided by governments) and the tax burden, can somehow allow a more 
adequately measure the "fiscal residuum" or "net tax burden" faced by individuals, 
regions or industries subject of measurement. If this variable captures the “hicksean's 
package of public goods” complementary and necessary for private activity, we will 
take into account the point made by Krause. Nevertheless, this objective will be 
resolved empirically in a second phase of this study. 
 
It is worth to mention now - in view of the legal interpretation that the issue may 
demand to judges - that the relevant international market for comparison will 
necessarily take into account the productivity level of rural activities in the world. 
That is, the market land values in the world inform about the marginal productivity 
value of land, which in a global competitive scenario will have necessarily to respond 
to a “diligent attitude in land exploitation” by capitalists and/or landowners. Judges 
can not qualify as inept or not diligent to all rural agents operating in a worldwide 
competitive market. 36 
 
 
 
                                               
36
 The specific benchmark to measure tax confiscation not necessarily will be matching for all rural 
activities, i.e., it’s not similar for all rural activities on which the tax burden is measured, though 
methodology for its identification is the same. For example, it is likely that a study of tax burden on the 
tobacco industry will estimate a greater tax burden relative to the rest of the agroindustrial chain activities 
worldwide, usually justified by the objective of public policies to discourage consumption of tobacco. The 
lands for growing snuff will suffer the "amortization effect" of the higher tax burden and, consequently, 
lower values for this type of land. 
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b) The price of land in Argentina and in U.S.A. 
 
To corroborate the tendency of convergence in the international value of land, it is 
interesting to observe the comparative performance of land prices in Argentina with 
respect to a country like U.S.A; both countries producer of grains and cattle. 
 
The U.S.A. selection for comparison is interesting, first, not only by the attribute of 
producing those "homogeneous products" - characteristic that defines a international 
tradable commodity as such - similar to those produced in Argentina; but also due to  
the quality of data that can be obtained from the website of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. Second, because it is a federal country, which in turn shows a high level 
of respect for private property and freedom of individuals, i.e. a country with an 
institutional quality higher than Argentina, to which it is supposed should also 
converge Argentina. 
 
A first approximation can be made for example by comparing the land values in the 
best corn-growing land of Iowa (U.S.A.) with the ones corresponding to the core area 
of corn-growing in the Province of Buenos Aires (Argentina), à la Reca (2008). 
 
Based on data from the Department of Agriculture U.S.A and AACREA (Argentina), 
Reca shows the price range set out in Table Nº 1. 
 
Table Nº 1 
Land prices / ha. in U.S. current dollars 
Year RA (1) Iowa (2) 
1986 1551,44 2596,00 
1987 1486,83 2886,28 
1988 1500,36 3476,72 
1989 1500,00 3757,11 
1990 1779,14 4004,50 
1991 2274,99 4020,99 
1992 2447,69 4119,95 
1993 2134,20 4205,72 
1994 2193,35 4472,90 
1995 2390,01 4802,76 
1996 3141,27 5548,25 
 30 
1997 4016,60 6059,53 
1998 4815,71 5940,78 
1999 4248,88 5874,81 
2000 3968,35 6125,50 
2001 3437,04 6353,10 
2002 2707,74 6870,98 
2003 3934,36 7504,32 
2004 5340,19 8672,02 
2005 6112,75 9612,12 
2006 7555,53 10568,71 
2007 9344,55 12673,00 
Notas: 
(1) Source for Argentina AACREA. 
(2) Source for Iowa USDA. "Iowa best land", estimated as an 
average or Iowa land values plus 1,32 (based on data 
analysis) 
      Source: Reca (2008).  
 
 
Correlation coefficient of the two series observes a ratio of 0.958729 * (R2 = 0.919161), 
and eliminating years 2001 and 2002 - corresponding to the two years of acute crisis of 
Argentina's economy - the ratio rises to 0.974960 * (R2 = 0.950548). 
  
 
 
Concept 
 
 
Full Data 
 
Data excluding 2001 and 2002 
 
Correlation Coefficient 
 
0,958729* 
 
0,974960* 
 
Coefficient R2 
 
 
0,917534 
 
0,950548 
 
  
 Note: * Significant at 1%. 
 
Graph Nº 1 shows the evolution of land prices, with base year 1986 = 100. 
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Graph Nº 1 
 
 
 
Both curves show the increasing trend of land values during the present decade, which 
actually coincide with the evolution to record corn price, and also of soybean price in the 
same period. 
  
Graph Nº 2 shows the evolution of land prices in the Corn Belt core area of the Province 
of Buenos Aires, and the prices of hard corn, soybeans and the simple average prices of 
both grains. The figure confirms the relationship between the land values, and 
consequently its rent, and the commodities prices related to use of land. Calculating the 
correlation between the evolution of variable “land value” and variable “simple average 
price of corn and soybeans”, yields the following results: 
 
 
 
Correlation Coefficient  
 
0,734886* 
 
Coefficient R2 
 
0,532025 
      
   Note: * Significant at 1%. 
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Graph Nº 2 
 
 
 
Graph Nº 2 shows that land values follow with a lag the evolution of corn and soybeans 
prices. Now, calculating the correlation between both variables with a lag of two periods 
clearly shows a high association between them. Graph Nº 3 shows this association and 
the chart below shows the coefficients found between the two variables, i.e. with land 
value with a lag of two years. 
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Graph Nº 3 
 
 
 
Correlation Coefficient 
 
 
0,827731* 
 
Coefficient R2 
 
0,685138 
 
   
Note: * Significant at 1%. 
 
 
In short, land values in Argentina closely follow the values of commodities produced 
with their use. These evolutions also show a similar trend to land prices with equal 
characteristics in the USA. It follows the hypothesis suggested in the beginning: the land 
rent and its value can not be far behind the evolution of product prices, that is, from the 
values of goods produced with the use of land. 
 
However, short-term variations observed between the land values in Iowa and in PBA, 
indicate that there are shorter-term volatilities due to shocks that influence the market 
values of land in both countries. The most striking of these differences, in the analyzed 
interval, was the negative economic shock and crisis caused by debt default in Argentina. 
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Graph Nº 4 shows the evolution of the relative price of land in state(Iowa)/province 
(Buenos Aires) and Graph Nº 5 shows the land prices evolution in Iowa state and in 
province of Buenos Aires omitting years 2001 and 2002, for a visual approximation of 
the difference with this omission occurs. 
 
Graph Nº 4 
 
 
Graph Nº 5 
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The land price of PBA, relative to land price of Iowa, shows an average trend rate of 
0.573512 for the period 1986 to 2007. 
 
Ending this point is important to mention that the market value of land is different to the 
land value “free of improvements”, or the “land original price without investments”, the 
value that usually is suggested must be the land tax base. Land markets measure land 
values taking into account all three characteristics outlined above: the attributes of 
original soil and climate, the geographical location and improvements. If tax design 
intention is that tax burden falls only on land, i.e., on the original characteristics of soil 
and climate - as could be a TLFI - the problem is how to isolate the impact on market 
value of soil component only. This problem led David Friedman to comment: “If you tax 
the market value of land, discourages people to increase the value of land used for 
working capital and improve, the supply curve is undoubtedly improved land perfectly 
inelastic. Therefore in order to impose the so-called single tax (a tax on the unimproved 
land, proposed as a substitute for all other taxes), you first have to find some way of 
estimating how much land it would be without any improvement - which is difficult ". 
 
Therefore, if benchmark measure arises from tax burden on the actual land market value 
there will be an underestimation of tax burden on the original land value (the "raw land" 
of Friedman). The Friedman's warning about the difficulty of estimating the value of land 
without improvements perhaps could be resolved through a thorough econometric study 
on base of the information now available through the GIS (Geographical Information 
System) and the satellite remote sensing technique. The possible measure of tax burden 
and confiscation would be obviously greater than figures analyzed en Appendix 3. 
 
4) Conclusions 
 
The underlying question looking for answer from the previous analysis is finally: Is it 
possible to attribute the long-time trend of differential of land price in Iowa relative to 
PBA (omitting short-term shocks) to location and original characteristics of land, 
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differences in sunk investments, or differences on tax burden and sovereign risk between 
the two countries? 
Based on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence analyzed in this study, is 
possible to support at least three points: 
 
(1) Despite the recovery of land prices in Argentina in recent years, land values in the 
PBA (Argentina) is lower - about half - to lands of Iowa (USA), confirmed by the 
data of the last two decades. 
 
(2) In Argentina, given the insignificant participation of subnational taxation in the 
consolidated tax burden on rural sector, it is impossible to impute to provinces' 
policies the impact of fiscal variables and institutional quality; the allocation of 
both ingredients (fiscal and institutional quality and/or sovereign risk) are clearly 
assignable to the national level of government. 
 
(3) Finally, "the million dollar question": Which is the “relevant determinant” of the 
difference? Is it perhaps the "land location and soil quality", is the "sunk 
investment" rather than government fiscal policies? Is it fiscal policy differencial 
of both countries? Is the difference in the quality of institutions? Or, there are 
others relevant factors not included in this analysis? 
 
Even though the absence of detail data on tax burden in the U.S.A., some general 
references of USA case and data of Appendix 3, are sufficient for a preliminary 
conclusion. The major determinant of the difference in land values should be attributed to 
high tax burden on the Argentine rural sector, particularly due to the high level of the tax 
on exports (retenciones). By contrast, there are no export taxes in the U.S.A., and, 
instead, there exist subsidies, explicit or less explicit, in the U.S.A.  In 2007, tax on 
exports of rural commodities in Argentina took out from the core zone around the 60% 
gross margin. This implies that if tax on exports would have not existed, the rent of land 
in that area would have been approximately a 140% higher. Therefore, the value of 
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Argentine land could have been higher than the one of Iowa. All other considerations on 
the rest of the tax burden structure on the rural sector are evidently redundant. 
If the benchmark for measuring the "reasonable economic limit" of the tax burden on the 
rural sector in Argentina (which would be equivalent to the limit of no confiscation), 
were the U.S., it is clear that confiscation is present in Argentina, from this point of view. 
 
Of course the simple empirical exercise of this document can only be taken as an 
example of mere approximation to the proposed methodology. For more robust results, 
would be necessary: first, expand the sample of countries in the comparisons (Federal and 
Unitary); and countries with different levels of GDP per capita, to finally locate the 
relative position of Argentina within countries with similar levels of development. 
Second, exploring the measurement of “tax burden” generated in each country by the 
taxation and subsidy policies. With the necessary data, econometrics could also provide 
interesting results if it could correlate land values with differential transport costs 
(relative to the different distances to centers of higher demand for rural commodities), 
different sunk investment, and finally, estimates or measurements on institutional quality. 
 
Let’s recall once again comments of Daniel Artana and Martin Krause about the 
“institutional quality”. Institutional quality should explain some of the differences, 
perhaps compensating towards a lower incidence of tax burden; or, conversely, 
reinforcing it. Krause notes that Iowa rural sector is also taxed, and producers receive 
some subsidies, but taxes net of subsidies in Iowa are paid; that is, tax compliance is 
probably much higher than in Argentina.37 Actually, institutional quality for Argentina is 
far away of the U.S.A. In a recent document of Martin Krause, the "index of institutional 
quality" of the United States is level 9, while Argentina is located in level 114.38 This 
                                               
37
 Figures on tax burden resulting from national accounts and discussed in Appendix 3 include the 
incidence of tax evasion, but not is included in the microsimulations, where no adjustments due to tax 
evasion are made. 
38
 Krause (2009). The Institutional Quality Index (IQI), developed by Kause through the ongoing work 
through the International Policy Network (International Politics) - an NGO from the United Kingdom and 
the United States - is a measurement that includes seven items: Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, 
Press Freedom, Corruption Levels, Competitiveness, and Ease of Doing Business Economic and two 
indicators of Freedom: the indicator of the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom and the Economic Freedom 
Indicator of the Wall Street Journal Heritage Foundation (WSJ Heritage). As the author points out, the 
measurement of institutional quality is relative, i.e. measures the position of one country over others, not 
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impacts on the capitals flows and, therefore, depresses the relative price of land in 
Argentina. 
 
The final suggestion is to alert and encourage legal scholars to explore, first, the legal 
vision of the economic approach to confiscation - particularly regarding how to compute 
taxes on rural sector to define tax burden, which includes a consolidated tax burden of the 
three levels of government, (on land property and on rural activities) - and the effects of 
this consolidated taxation on land value; and, second, the question of the legal boundary 
(or rate) set by the Supreme Court as confiscatory and the utility which provides the 
information on the value of land in the world market and its determinants, just in order to 
define a benchmark for confiscation of land through the relevant international market. 
This would help to clarify judges (for ratify or modify) their jurisprudence on the current 
parameter of 33%, and reduce the degree of uncertainty about a possible future re-
estimation of confiscation rate, “under new circumstances”. 
 
The legal and political relevance of such determination is evident, and the preliminary 
figures consulted in this study, perhaps with probable variations up or down, and finally, 
the preliminary rate of 33% set for the Supreme Court as a general reference repeatedly 
set till now, are clearly testing an scenario of confiscation in the rural sector of Argentina. 
                                                                                                                                            
against a standard of perfection. While America is a country that occupies the ninth position in regard to 
institutional quality, shows weaknesses that are common to all countries, because after the removal of the 
gold standard monetary institutions implemented discretionary policies, or, in some cases, they decided to 
tie their currencies to currencies of other countries that practiced such policies. Today the whole 
international monetary system is subject to the discretion of the monetary authorities of the United States, 
when the dollar is the international currency par excellence and those of other major currencies like the 
euro, sterling and yen. In the same way that “legal discretion” implies "legal uncertainty”, the 
"discretionary in monetary policies" means "monetary and financial insecurity", which is a poor 
institutional quality in this particular area. 
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Appendix 1  
Taxation on Rural Sector: Tax Burden' Incidence on Land Value 
 
The analysis of the differential incidence of the tax on land “free of improvements”, with 
respect to taxes on the use of variable factors (labor and capital), which affect the value 
of agricultural production or cause excess burden, has been the usual concern in the 
discussion of land taxation. However, literature has neglected a common consequence of 
taxation on rural sector, which is that “all taxes” – not only the real state tax - will be 
depreciated in land value. At the same time, another important effect of public policy on 
rural sector, not always considered, though anyhow relevant, is the laudable objective to 
generate incentives to rural settlement, i.e. incentives to invest (assign variable factors) 
and/or produce within a given territory (provincial or municipal) by landlords, that is, the 
permanent rural residents; or, conversely, induce the use or explotation of land by tenants 
or non-resident investors in those territories. 
 
In a federal country, the allocation of variable factors of production in provincial 
territories, ceteris paribus, will depend on the differential tax treatment on such resources 
by the consolidated tax burden of the Nation and the provinces. The regional economies 
have similar production functions in terms of recognizing the existence of the variable 
factors "labor and capital", and the fixed factor “land”. In that case, different tax 
treatments in each jurisdiction on variable factors (labor and capital) affect their use and, 
consequently, the level of activity. In the case of the fixed factor "land" the incidence will 
impact on its market value - whether, amortizing or capitalizing on its value - depending 
on whether fiscal treatment is positive (tax) or negative (subsidy). 
 
Suppose that in the Province of Buenos Aires (PBA) consolidated tax burden on factors 
of production is higher than in the rest of provinces. The difference in net of tax margins 
perceived by the markets, in the short term would generate - ceteris paribus - a lower 
farm activity level in the PBA relative to the rest of provinces. If the reallocation of 
capital and labor migration function according to economic incentives, part of the capital 
and workers will migrate to regions with low tax burden attracted by cost reduction, and, 
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in consequence, higher after-tax return on capital and the existence of opportunities of job 
with relative increase in average wages. In those provinces will increase the exploitation 
of land or an increase of the intensive use of land; while in the PBA will reduce it. But in 
the long run, the highest net margin after taxes of the agricultural holdings of the 
remaining provinces shall be capitalized in land value, while costs investment and 
residence of workers will rise, so that differences in average returns of capital and real 
wages after taxes between regions will gradually disappear.39 In the PBA, the initial 
effect in the short-term will be a lower level of intensive land use, but amortization of the 
highest tax burden in the long term will involve a reduction in land values, and finally 
will lead - ceteris paribus - to the land intensive use equal to the remaining provinces.40 
 
In analytical terms, suppose a federation with a set of regional economies operating with 
the same production functions of three factors: F (L, K, T), labor (L), capital (K) and 
land (T), and constant returns to scale. Supply curves of factors L and K are "normal 
sloping", and the supply of land is fixed (T ≡ T*). Governments’ expenditures (national 
and provincial) are financed with a consolidated tax rate on factors used. Within each j 
jurisdiction, tj is the tax rate per unit of factor, which is assumed to be different betweeen 
j provincial jurisdictions. 
 
The allocation of the supply variable factors Lj and Kj in each jurisdiction j will observe 
the first order conditions:  
 
FLj (Lj, Kj, T*j) = wj + tj 
FKj (Lj, Kj, T*j) = φj + tj 
 
Where wj and φj are the net payments (reserve values) of factors Kj and Lj, and (wj + tj) 
and (φj + tj) are the tax gross-factor costs, respectively. 
                                               
39
 That is, average returns on capital and real wages in the long-term could not be different between 
regions, assuming perfect mobility of both factors and competing regions (price takers) in the national 
economy. 
40
 The adjustment will be a lower income obtained by landowners-capitalist exploiting their own land, or a 
lower leasing value of land. 
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Since land factor is fixed (Tj = Tj*), the production function can be expressed as 
depending on the use of factors Lj and Kj per unit of land (Tj *), ie: 
 
lj  = Lj/ Tj* 
 kj = Kj/ Tj* 
 
Then: 
Fj (Lj, Kj, Tj*)   ≡   F (lj; kj; 1) 
 
If the regional rural product price is assumed constant and is taken as numeraire, the first 
order conditions require: 
 
(1) f´lj = wj + tj 
(2)  f´kj = φj + tj 
 
 
The land rent at j (Rj) is then: 
 
(3) Rj = Tj* (1 – tj) – ( lj . f´lj ) – ( kj . f´kj ) 
 
Assuming that provinces are small compared to the size of the economy, will behave as 
competitors (price takers) with respect to the remuneration of mobile factors, i.e.: 
 
wj = w*; φj = φ* 
 
Then the values of lj and kj will depend on tj in expressions (1), (2) and (3). Now, 
differentiating (1) and (2) to changes in tj: 
 
(4) (∂f´lj/∂lj) . (∂lj/∂tj)  =  (∂w*/∂tj) + (∂tj/∂tj) 
(5) (∂f´kj/∂kj) . (∂kj/∂tj) =  (∂φ*/∂tj) + (∂tj/∂tj) 
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That is, 
f″lj  . (∂lj/∂tj)  = 0 + 1 = 1 
f″kj . (∂kj/∂tj) = 0 + 1 = 1 
 
Then: 
 ∂lj/∂tj   = 1 / f″ļj  < 0 
∂kj/∂tj  = 1 / f″ķj < 0 
 
because ∂lj/∂tj < 0; (∂k/∂tj) < 0. This means that Lj and Kj will move to other jurisdictions 
if tj increases or immigrate to the jurisdiction if tj decreases. So, if tj decreases, since w* 
and φ* are constant, marginal cost of both factors will decrease (because tj1 < tj0) and, 
consequently, their allocations will increase in the jurisdiction. 
 
The described change can be observed in Figures 3 (a) and 3 (b): 
 
                        Figura 3 (a)        Figura 3 (b) 
 
 
           wj+ tj       φj+ tj 
                        
      (w*+ tj)0              (φ*+ tj)0  
         
 
      (w*+ tj)1              (φ*+ tj)1 
         
         f´kj  
                   
f´lj       
         
 0
      
lj0      lj1       Lj                    0       kj0         kj1                   Kj 
 
Therefore, returning to the expression (3) and replacing values for time 0 (before the fall 
in tax) and of time 1 (after the fall in tax), it follows that: 
 
(6) Rj1 > Rj0  41 
                                               
41
 An observation made by Eusebio Cleto del Rey (UNSa) in opportunity to develop this model to discuss 
the economic effects of federal equalization transfers (Piffano, 2004), warns about the possibility of 
inversion of this result if the increased use of lj and kj factors, set out with a negative sign in (3), more than 
offsets the fall of the respective marginal products, i.e. depending on whether the elasticities of the curves 
that show Figures 3 (a) and 3 (b), are greater or higher than one (in absolute value). The answer to this 
criticism is that the increase in the absolute levels of factors labor and capital variables may absorb higher 
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Since the value of land in jurisdiction j (Vj) is equivalent to the present value of rent 
flow, assuming constant returns in perpetuity, result: 
 
(7) Vj = Rj / φ* 
 
Therefore: 
 
(8) Vj1 > Vj0 
 
That is, the tax reduction in j has been capitalized in the value of the fixed factor land. 
 
Similar reasoning, but with reversed results, leads to conclude that a greater tax burden in 
the PBA will be amortized on lower land value in the province. This reduction confirms 
the impact of taxation on the land values, but can be added other effect. Changes in the 
net returns (after tax) per hectare may probably modify in the long-term direct 
exploitation of land by landlords, meaning by the land owner-resident of the affected 
rural area. Lower rent for private landowners - that is, less financial surplus - generates 
less ability and incentive to an individual owner to apply capital and labor on his farm, 
due to higher costs per hectare that usually will face to perform rural activity, and very 
probably induces the lease policy, hoping that the leasing of his land will generate greater 
gains that the net margin obtained with direct exploitation, and, on the one hand, that 
lower rent after tax will anyway attract other capitalists to invest in the property levied.42 
If the purpose of taxation was to ensure the population settlement in rural areas, a high 
tax burden does not generate such a result. It will encourage the dissemination of leasing 
                                                                                                                                            
income in the region of lower tax burden, as a result of increased investment and employment. However, 
the increased demand for land (fixed factor) will generate increases in value when the variable factors 
compete to settle in it, generating increases in the level of output per hectare of the region [f (T) in 
expresion (3)] through a more intensive use of land after reducing tj per hectare. The owner of fixed factor 
land of that region will increase its surplus (rent) by the use of variable factors equivalent to the shaded 
areas in Figures 3 (a) and 3 (b). Actually, this increased surplus explains the increase in rents and/or in land 
value. 
42
 The tillage cost, input costs and the use of technology at their disposal, can be less competitive relative to 
larger producers or associated companies (seedl-pool) that operate with greater economies of scale and 
posible spreading of risk, than the individual producer. The "seed-pool" is a type of technical-economic-
financial organization that allows generating higher margins than those obtained by any individual land 
owner. 
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contracts and "tenants' companies" as the more beneficial modality to operate farming 
businesses, turning the landowner into a mere rentist. 
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Appendix 2 
Differences between TLFI and taxes on rural production43 
 
 
i) Neutral effects versus distorting effects of land taxation 
 
One way to explain the effects of taxation on the level of land use or level of agricultural 
production and, consequently, rent generation, is to use the wellknown diagrams of 
Figures 4 and 5 set out below. 
 
Figure 4 simulates the effect of a TLFI (Tax on Land Free of Improvements). The 
introduction of a TLFI displaces symmetrically the total cost curve upward (dotted line), 
not altering the relationship between price (marginal revenue) and marginal cost. That is, 
the optimal size of output (q*) is the same before and after tax. 
 
Figure 4 – Effect of a TLFI 
 
     Sales  Total Costs (before and after TLFI)      Sales value 
     Costs  
 
 
 
 
         
                          TLFI 
0      Q/Ha 
 
      Price             Marginal Cost 
    Marginal Cost 
                Price 
      
    0          q*                    Q/Ha 
 
                                               
43
 Extracted from Piffano and Sturzenegger (2009). 
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In contrast, in Figure 5 is observed the effect of an introduction of a tax on land 
improvements being broadly defined, i.e. including variable inputs like agrochemicals, 
seeds, etc., and semi-variable, such as fences, watering, mills, etc. The optimal 
production level will be located in q’ (where q’ < q*). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Effect of a Tax on Improvements 
 
       Sales       Total Cost (before and after tax on improvements)         Sales value 
        Costs  
 
 
 
 
            
                           Fixed Costs 
 
     0                    q’    q*          Q/Ha 
                  Price               Marginal Cost 
    Marginal Cost 
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      0          q`   q*       Q/Ha 
 
 
Relative prices of variable imputs and semi-variable inputs are affected, so taxation 
generates excess burden. Any tax that penalizes the improvements will have this negative 
effect. 
  
Since agricultural products are tradable goods the price facing by producers are the 
international price, so all taxes on production could not be shifted forward. 
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Now, Figure 6 shows the case of a "accumulative sales tax" (Ingresos Brutos) or a Tax on 
Exports (Retenciones) -; the price net of production tax corresponds to the dotted line. By 
changing the slope of the sales value line (due to the falling of net price) the optimal size 
of production is located at a lower level than the situation before tax (q’ < q*). 
 
 
Figure 6 – Effect of a tax on production value 
(Ingresos Brutos and/or Retenciones) 
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Finally, Figure 7 illustrates the loss of agricultural producer surplus - equivalent to the 
loss of social rent of land – after a production tax and a tax on exports. 
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Figure 7 – Effect of a tax on production or tax on exports 
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The reduction of land rent, either social and private, includes the dead weight lost or 
excess tax burden, along with the revenue obtained by the government, and the subsidy 
received by the domestic demand (mainly meat processing industries, vegetable oil and 
grain milling). So, Figure 7 clarifies the negative economic effect of introducing a tax on 
exports and also a tax on rural activity like the provincial tax “Ingresos Brutos” (turn-
over-tax); this tax makes impossible to introduce border tax adjustments' mechanisms.44 
 
Without any tax on exports, producer faces P0 (the international price in dollars by the 
exchange rate), i.e. an infinitely elastic demand curve at the level of P0. At this price, 
rural sector produces q0. Part of that product - quantity q1 - is consumed internally and 
the difference (q0 - q1) is exports. 
 
Introducing a tax on export means a reduction of domestic price to level P1. This lower 
price and the existence of increasing production costs, induces a supply reduction to level 
q2. Conversely, the lower domestic price pushes domestic demand to level q3. As 
combined result of production reduction and domestic demand increase, exportable 
surplus reduces to (q2 - q3). The Government obtains revenues equivalent to this reduced 
exportable surplus multiplied by the price differential caused by the tax (P0 - P1) i.e. the 
area DCBF. The effect on owners factors’ welfare (landowners, entrepreneurs and rural 
                                               
44
 Ending Appendix 3 there is an explanation of the different incidence of the national VAT; for further 
extensions see Piffano (2007). 
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workers) due to tax is obviously negative; but the the reduction in welfare in monetary 
terms of rural sector is higher than the revenues obtained by the Government. The loss is 
equivalent to the trapezoid P0ABP1. This welfare loss of rural sector - which will not be 
shifted forward - can be divided into the following areas: the area DCBF corresponding 
to the revenues collected by the Government, the area P0EFP1 that measures the welfare 
gains of domestic demanders, and the areas EDF and ABC, measuring the excess burden. 
 
In some estimations of tax burden on agricultural sector, only revenues obtained by 
Government are computed. However, following a similar approach adopted in public 
accounting dealing with the notion "tax expenditures", measuring tax burden on rural 
sector should also include the P0DFP1 area. The whole area P0ABP1 represents the 
equivalent effect of setting a “production tax” that reduces the net price obtained by 
supplier or producer, which partially allows financing the subsidy for domestic demand 
(area P0DFP1).45 
 
The effect of a provincial sales tax like “Ingresos Brutos” also implies a reduction in the 
net price received by suppliers, but in this case without any subsidy to domestic 
demanders. The welfare reduction in rural sector is anyhow equivalent. 
 
The internal price reduction produced by tax on export means a drop in the value added 
of rural sector, but, from the diagrams can not be identified which of the specific 
components of the value added will be affected. With the help of Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, changing its assumptions to a new scenario more in line with present 
economies, and taking into account the characteristics of the agricultural production 
function - essentially assuming that the supply of capital is infinitely elastic (not fixed), 
the supply of labor relatively elastic, and supply of land perfectly inelastic or fixed - the 
result can be demonstrated very simply. The tax on exports will involves falls in rural 
                                               
45
 The domestic price reduction resulting from the tax on exports is equivalent to generate an additional 
cost to the sector's production value, and a consequent reduction in rural rent. The lack of calculating the 
effect "tax plus subsidy" is much more important here than in the traditional concept "tax expenditures” 
which measures the value of uncollected tax and the equivalent subsidy - without any budget records - 
which benefits the same taxpayer. In case of a tax on exports, "the tax is paid" and "the subsidy is also 
paid" through the market mechanism, while those who contribute or pay the tax are not the same peopel 
who receive the subsidy. For extensions see Piffano (2007). 
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workers' real wages denoting small regional mobility, and, essentially, declines in values 
of landlords’ properties, due to the effect of amortization of taxes on land values.46 
 
Finally, the decrease in production after tax on exports does not imply a similar or 
equiproportional reduction in all agricultural producers or in all lands. Those affected will 
be producers and owners of marginal lands, those who will probably obtain a rent near 
zero or perhaps negative, and, therefore, these lands will be pushed out of production.47  
 
ii) The concept "Land Rent" 
 
The theory of taxation on rural sector, specifically referring to taxation on rural land, has 
recognized the presence of at least three important factors in determining the tax base and 
linked to them the design of the structure of tax rates: the original characteristics of land 
(soil and climate), geographical location and improvements.48  
 
The differences between those components are important in order to take into account the 
different economic implications of tax policy. 
 
The agricultural production function, unlike industrial production or services, has land as 
the predominant production factor; because the land is the fundamental resource on 
which primary activity is supported. The "land factor" has unique characteristics that 
distinguish it from the other factors (labor and capital): it is not produced by human labor, 
is not reproducible, is limited in quantity and its quality is heterogeneous. 
 
                                               
46
 See again Appendix 1 for the formal proof of this point. 
47
 The explanation of this effect can be analyzed by a simple numerical example and using diagrams that 
are explained in the next point. 
48
 Actually, it is possible to add at least three variables more to the list of determinants of the value of a 
property, namely: technology, relative prices between outputs and inputs and the government trade policy. 
However, the ability of the soil, climate and location, are specific factors (originals factors) of each parcel, 
while the technology and relative prices - including the impact of trade policy - are common to all parcels, 
i.e. do not matter the heterogeneity of lands, but land heterogeneity is relevant in the determination of his 
potential earning. Finally, the relative prices of outputs and inputs affect the development of technology 
and this in turn will affect the original components of the soil. 
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Due to this characteristic attribute of land - fixed or not reproducible - it is necessary to 
emphasize the notion of "rent" to be imputing it as “economic return” by its use. This 
return is determined as residual income that its landowner will obtain after the payment 
of the remaining "variables factors", labor and capital. 
 
First, land is not reproducible; it is not possible “to create land”, at least under conditions 
making their use economically feasible.49 Second, in principle, land is of unlimited 
duration, so, if it is misused, i.e., if it is preserved with appropriate techniques, may last 
over time while maintaining its original fertility. Thirdly, land is not uniform, since it has 
differences in natural fertility or climate and manifested in higher yields or lower yields, 
or, from another angle, with lower costs or higher costs for equal level of production.  
Fourth, land is not transferable in space, unlike the factors labor and capital which can be 
mobilized with different degrees of intensity, so it is a resource "nontradable” (no 
possibility of redistribution or reallocation between regions). Fifthly, the geographical 
land location or distance to the marketing centers generates differentials in transport costs 
of agricultural products. The geographical location can also generate an extra rent due to 
proximity to urban areas. 
 
Finally, in spite of its all differential characteristics to the other factors of production 
already cited, in capitalist countries, land has a common denominator to the rest factors of 
production: the recognition of the right for private property. In any capitalist society, land 
is owned by individuals. However, ownership of a resource whose supply can not be 
expanded and it is inherently immobil, poses a major difference with respect to the 
ownership of the other factors, which has been discussed and analized by several theories 
and has lead to different political positions regarding the definition or design of public 
policies. 
 
 
                                               
49
 According to present state of arts, on a small scale some exceptions are possible, for example, through 
the "hydroponics". Hydroponics or hydroponic farming is a method used for growing plants using mineral 
nutrient solutions instead of agricultural land. This is a technology that introduces mineral nutrients in the 
water supply of a plant which for that reason does not require soil to thrive. 
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a) The classical and neoclassical notion of "land rent" 
 
Economic theory has developed different approachs for the definition of "land rent".  At 
least two views can be recognized: a) the "Classical School", which is the first school in 
constructing a theory of land rent (from different positions: William Petty, Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, Karl Marx, etc.), and b) the "Neoclassical School" (Marshall, Barlowe, 
Samuelson, etc.), which, although with no new significative contributions, introduces an 
important conceptual shift. 
 
The classics understood the notions "rent", "wages" and "benefit" as if they were related 
to three different social classes: the landlords - who were supposed living on from land 
leasing and not from their own exploitation - workers and capitalists (owners of capital) 
who performed the rural activity. Moreover, this conception was linked to a historical 
conception of the structure of society, where individuals are not all equal in terms of the 
economic means available to them. In this context, the rent of land is understood as a 
social category, and can explain the behavior of a part of society. From the neoclassical 
point of view, however, society is a "conglomeration of individuals"; where people take 
similar or different markets decisions, but no necessarily have a specific "class behavior". 
The social behavior can be explained as the sum of these individual behaviors and, 
therefore, the social demand for land can be explained by the sum of individual demands 
of farmers. For the neoclassicals, "rent" is also a broad category and relates to the income 
a person receives by any property ownership or capability available only in smaller 
amounts for social demand, and which can be "land", "an a natural wealth", "an special 
ability to play football" or "an very special or a very good voice for singing", and can be 
permanent or temporary.50 
 
 
                                               
50
 Referring to land rent, David Ricardo says: "Rent is that portion of land product that is paid to the 
landlord for the use of original and indestructible power of soil". 
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b) The economic yield of land, the original characteristics of soil and climate, and 
land location (rent differential by "extensive land use" and rent differential due to 
location) 
 
The concept of differential rent by "extensive margin" refers to the traditional approach 
of the classical school. To explain the concept, suppose that there is a country where 
uncultivated lands is freely available to any capitalist that wants to invest in them to 
produce and thus, obtain an income without paying anyone for land use. The available 
lands have different qualities depending on their natural fertility, water availability, 
proximity to consumer markets, etc. These lands could be classified, for example 
according to fertility and climate, in A, B and C, where land type "A" is land of best 
quality. Assume further that for the production of wheat, 1,000 units of capital per 
hectare (ha) should be invested to obtain an average gain of 50% similar to any 
alternative activity (opportunity cost of capital). This benefit is the one expected by any 
capitalist to place their capital on any investment, including agriculture, and if he or she 
thinks that cannot get that benefit by producing wheat, will invest in another activity 
where that profit would be assured. 
 
If there is demand for wheat in the market and there are different qualities of land to 
produce wheat, it's reasonable to think that entrepreneurs will tend to invest their capital 
first in the best lands, while there is nothing that prevents them from doing so. But as 
fertility will be different (lower) when the available new land is used, and employers are 
equal, the cost of producing in lands of different quality will be different. 
 
Suppose that yield in land A is 12.5 quintals/ha; in land B is 10 quintals/ha; and in land C 
is 8.33 quintals/ha. By investing $ 1,000 per hectare, the average land cost will be $ 80/qq 
in land A, $ 100/qq in land B; and, $ 120/qq. in land C. 
 
At the begining, the capitalist produces in the best lands (land A). Invests $1,000/ha for 
wheat production, and consumes $80/qq in inputs. This is the "price cost" of a quintal of 
wheat. As the average profit of capital is 50%, from $80 is expected a profit of $40, so 
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one quintal of wheat should be sold in $120, to cover costs and earn profits of 50%. With 
increasing population, the wheat market continues to develop, and the capitalist will 
continue to occupy lands type A until that availability of this type of land is exhausted, 
because land availability is finite in extension or quantity. But the price of wheat will 
increase as demand increases, so with this new (higher) price will justify the exploitation 
of lands of inferior quality. Then, entrepreneurs will invest in land of type "B" if they get 
the average rate of profit (this is, the opportunity cost of capital or the average profit rate 
of the economy). If capitalists can invest in land type "B" and obtain 50% gain, it won't 
matter to investor, who capitalist has produced, or who capitalist is producing in land 
type "A" at the same time. 
 
If food consumption is increasing and thus also the price of wheat, there may be 
entrepreneurs willing to invest now in land type "C". This will finally happen when the 
price of wheat goes up enough to sell a quintal for $180; then, lands type "C" will enter in 
production. 
 
Let's see what happens with the profits obtained by capitalists: entrepreneurs located in 
land type C get a price which covers costs and earn the average return on invested capital 
(50% = $ 40). Those located in land B cover the costs, obtain the average profit on 
invested capital (50% = $50) and get an “extra-gain” of $30, because the price he or she 
was willing to sell (given the assumption of free use of land) is $150. That “surplus 
profit” above normal profit on capital is the “rent” attributable to land. The entrepreneur 
located in land type A, finally, covers costs, gets an average profit on capital invested 
(50% = $ 40) and a gain surplus or rent of $ 60, because the final product price is higher 
than the total cost (including the average return to capital) of producing wheat on land A. 
 
Then, the benefit identified as “excess profit” above the normal average return on 
investment, is the "land rent” or “rent differential due to fertility", that is, the economic 
return attributable to the production factor "land". 
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Why market does not determine a commercial price which corresponds to the cost of 
production of individual entrepreneurs? Because the land availability is already exhausted 
(has a limited use range), it is not possible to use the avaible land for any aditional capital 
flow, because lands are fully occupied. This means that the capital invested in the poorest 
lands are those that finally regulate the market trading price (the marginal cost of 
producing wheat). 
 
So far we have not discussed the ways of land tenure. And suppose now a landless 
agricultural entrepreneur. He or she is simply a capitalist who wants to invest in 
agricultural activities with the sole purpose of obtaining an average profit for capital to 
invest. In addition there will be landlords who have no capital, or who have insufficient 
capital, and/or finally wish to invest their capital in another business, giving land on 
lease, not assuming any risk in rural activities. What will be the price to ask for rent or 
lease for their land? Exactly the surplus income or gains above the normal return on 
capital, that is, the "land rent": $60 for land type A and $30 for land type B. 
 
In summary, the results achieved by the activity in each type of land (soil) are: 
 
Lands A:        P: $ 180 C: $   80 G: $ 40   R: $ 60  
Lands B:  P: $ 180 C: $ 100 G: $ 50 R: $ 30  
Lands C:  P: $ 180 C: $ 120 G: $ 60 R: $ 0 
 
Where:  
 
P:  Product Price ($/qq) 
C: Average costs of production ($/qq) 
G: Average earnings on invested capital ($/qq) 
R: Rent (or excess profit above the average return on investment) ($/qq) 
 
That is, lands of different quality will generate different capital productivity. The 
productivity gap is due to quality differences of land - as the capital invested is always 
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the same ($1,000) - their payback diferencial is the "rent of land". Remembering the 
Classics is the landowner or landowner who naturally appropriates this surplus or 
economic rent. 
 
A similar analysis can be done with regard to differences in location of lands with respect 
to consumption centers. Suppose that land A, B and C are of equal fertility and differ 
only by their distance from the market, being the most distant land type C (100 km), but 
with expected return on investment equal to those of lands types A and B (both at 0 and 
50 km. the market, respectively). The costs will be higher in land type C for higher 
transport costs (freight). In the same way as for the previous case, the differences in 
earnings or “income surplus” obtained in land type A, in comparison with land B; and 
lands type B in comparison with land type C, are the "differential rent” due to location. 
 
d) The performance of variable factors and technological change: rent differential 
due to “intensive margin” 
 
Returning to the case of rent differential due to fertility and assuming an increase in 
demand for wheat, production could be intensified in lands type A and/or type B. And 
this is what happen. If the capitalists of different type of lands, increase the amount of 
capital invested per ha (that is, if they intensify agricultural production), and they manage 
to get the average profit from that marginal investment, will be interested in producing 
more intensively. Taking for example the case of land type B, and assuming that the 
trading price of wheat is still $ 180/qq, regulated by the worst land C, and considering 
that the average profit is 50%, we can analyze what would happen if the capital 
investment per hectare in land B is double higher. The new investment, however, will no 
longer yield 10 quintals/ha, but 9.09 quintals/ha for the second investment of $1,000. The 
cost per quintal will then be $1,000/9.09 = $110/qq, and if capitalists are seeking to 
obtain the average profit on capital invested, the wheat price should be $ 165/qq. 
 
But the trading price of wheat remains $180/qq, because lands type C are producing, and 
they regulate the wheat price at this level. Then the surplus of the second investment in 
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lands type B will be $ 15. This is due to the difference in productivity of additional 
investment of capital in a particular type of land, relative to capital investments in the 
poorest lands. It is the productivity gap between the second equity investment in land 
type B and the normal productivity of investment in C that leads to this new surplus. 
Therefore, this new surplus also will benefits the landowners, and is called "rent 
differential" due to “intensive margin”. 
 
e) The “property rent” and the concept of “absolute rent” 
 
In the literature on the topic can be found also a misleading interpretation of land rent 
concept.51 It is assigning a value to the property of land for the simple reason of having 
legal domain on a non reproducible resource. It is understood that although the lands of 
worst fertility could not generate any surplus profit on capital invested - or land rent in 
extensive or intensive sense - however the landlords could enjoy of a rent due to the 
possibility of Domain transfers for the potential use of land for agricultural production. 
This rent is called “absolute rent”.  
 
Now if lands type C do not produce any additional surplus or a positive land rent, the 
question that arises is why there will be a capitalist willing to rent a property of this type, 
if from the normal return to capital would have to subtract the cost of the lease? The 
profit would be lower than normal, so that would have no incentive to allocate capital to 
an agricultural enterprise, but rather allocate that capital to other activities which ensure 
the normal profit without having to pay royalties or lease for use of a limited resource 
such as the land. The lands rent is only justified if the "expected return" by the capitalist, 
is finally higher than normal benefits, that is, if the land exploitation generates a return 
with a surplus income on invested capital - meaning a benefit higher than the normal 
benefits of other investments with similar risk - with which to cover the rent. Precisely 
this surplus is the "land rent", which sets the maximum amount of rent due for the lease. 
 
                                               
51
 See for example Pasinelli, L. (2002). 
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So if land does not generate any differential rent - extensive and/or intensive - its market 
value would tend to zero, i.e., the land rent would be zero. There would be no capitalist 
willing to invest in any activity returning money less than the normal return (due to rental 
value of the property or its use cost) . That is, carry zero differential rent - extensive and 
intensive - would lead the lands value to zero. 
 
An important consequence derived of zero differential rent, is that the government could 
not levy any tax on land property, since the land tax base would be zero. And a second 
implication is that even with a positive land rent, the design of the land tax should take 
into account possible short-term shocks that could potentially reduce significantly the 
value of that tax base during one or more fiscal periods, which could lead to a 
confiscatory scenario, the principal issue discussed in this paper. For this reason it is 
often suggested that the cadastral values - administratively determinated - or the tax base 
of rural property taxes, should maintain a "razonable distance" from the market value of 
land. 
 
From another angle, on considering land ownership may emerge another possible 
misinterpretation: the qualification of landowners as mere “rentiers”, enjoying a special 
benefit or a privilege that property rights would be generating, allowing them to obtain 
income “without any effort”. In fact, the present value of land rent flow is the monetary 
value of the property. But this value of the property must have been paid by the owner at 
the time of obtaining the legal land domain. 
 
However, it has been suggested previously that the land value will be linked to its ability 
to generate profits for a certain maturation period of investment (for example, grain 
production cycle or the even more extensive livestock production). But land property 
could lead to an expectation of profits much further apart in time. That expectation of 
future opportunities (even with a high uncertainty of a future potential rent) could justify 
a value higher than zero of properties even without an immediate or present productive 
use. Other arguments for a positive value of the land - also without immediate option to 
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make land produce - are: its role as a store of future value, as a possible mean for 
covering saving from inflation, or benefits emerging from the territorial domain.52 
 
iii) Good lands and marginal lands 
 
Returning to the neoclassical notion and following Barlowe (1958) and Mochon and 
Beker (1997) in the treatment of the generation of land rent, is possible to demonstrate 
that maximization of land rent is equivalente to maximization of profits of any company, 
that is, the optimal point for maximizing land rent may be obtained by equalizing 
marginal cost with marginal revenue. 
 
However, to avoid confusion between the concept of the land rent maximization with the 
maximization of capital benefits, within the cost should be included the normal profit on 
capital (or average profit), plus the reward to the entrepreneurs. Thus, the surplus over 
costs so defined will correspond to the notion of “land rent”. 
 
The example presented below is taken from Barlowe's original work on the calculation of 
marginal and average costs per unit of production for determining the economic rent 
price in variable situations. 
 
In Table 1, column 3, is calculated the marginal product. The marginal cost for each unit 
of variable investment is assumed to equal $5. If the market price of the product is $2.50 
per unit, the entrepreneur will optimize production level when marginal cost is also 
$2.50. That is, according to the example, will use up to 10 units to maximize the 
                                               
52
 The attribute of territorial domain has often been cited as an expression of political and social domain for 
many years in many countries, including Argentina, attributable to the landowners. These landowners 
seized the land rents generated at the beginning of the agricultural frontier expansion, and political control 
exercised by them was naturally important. When land is valued by the social prestige that grants its 
possession or as a store of value that protects against inflation processes, or provides security for possible 
social seizures or sovereign risk, for example, the investors will be willing to pay more for land property 
and the land values will then be greater than the value of their present oportunity cost from an exclusive 
productivity point of view, i.e. its market price will be positive and greater than the present value of long-
term productivity. But there are many other assets that can be assimilated to land, which could also offer 
prestige and / or coverage for any inflationary processes or sovereign risks, such as collecting gold, 
artwork, jewelry, vintage cars, etc. 
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investment return. At that point the surplus is equal to Median Income (MI), less the 
Average Cost (AC), multiplied by the number of units produced, namely: 
 
R = (MI - AC) x n 
 
Table 1 show that rent at that point will be: 
 
1) If product price is $2,50, then R = ($2,5 - $1) x 50 = $75 
 
2) If product price is $1,67, then R = ($1,67 - $0.94) x 48 = $35.04  
 
Obviously, a lower product price reduces the quantities produced, and reduces the land 
rent value. 
 
Table 1 
 
Variable 
Investment 
Units 
              
Production 
Units 
            
Marginal 
product 
obtained 
Marginal 
cost 
(MC) 
Average 
cost 
(AC) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) = $5/(3) (5) = (1)*$5/(2) 
1 3 3 1,67 1,67 
2 8 5 1,00 1,25 
3 15 7 0,71 1,00 
4 23 8 0,63 0,87 
5 30 7 0,71 0,83 
6 36 6 0,83 0,83 
7 41 5 1,00 0,85 
8 45 4 1,25 0,89 
9 48 3 1,67 0,94 
10 50 2 2,50 1,00 
11 51 1 5,00 1,08 
12 51,5 0,5 10,00 1,17 
 
Graphically: 
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Figure 8 
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Where,  
 
MT = Product Price = Median Income = Marginal Revenue; 
MN = Units Produced;  
NP = MS = Average Cost (at the optimal price MT); 
TRPS = Land Rent = TS x SP 
 
If Figure 8 is assimilated to the case of land type A, can also be plotted the differences 
between the rents of lands of quality B and C: 
 
Figure 9 
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The average cost of producing wheat in land type A, is lower and thus obtains a higher 
land rent than land rent obtained by land type B. Land type C does not generate rent for 
intensive or extensive nature (see solid lines in Figure 9 (b)). The marginalist approach, 
therefore, would not recognize the existence of absolute rent, while any attempt to use 
marginal land type C would involve a normal profit to be shared between the landowner 
and the lessor or entrepreneur who decide to lease the land. If the price elasticity of 
capital supply is infinitely elastic (small country and perfect capital mobility) there would 
be no interest in exploiting this type of land, unless the landlord hires an enterprise or big 
society that would operates with lower costs due to scale, and thus reduce unit costs 
below unit costs which faces the individual landowner of land type C. In Figure 9 (b) this 
possibility is plotted with dotted cost lines. The land rent would be TRS'P’. Therefore, in 
case of landowners of this marginal land only would be economically viable the land 
leasing to that type of big enterprise, operating with economies of scale. 
 
It may be noted ultimately that extensive use and/or intensive land use depends on 
commodities prices produced by rural sector. In fact, the level of relative prices of 
products defines which type of land will be exploited, and to what intensity, depending 
on the differential land rents of each land types (A, B, C). Such land rent differentials will 
determine, therefore, the magnitude of the extensive and intensive use of land. 
 
Finally, with respect to prices, the relevant prices that will guide decision making of 
entrepreneurs will be those which they “perceive” or they "expect" - based on the current 
situation and future prices trends - and risk perception to be assumed by domestic 
farming.53 
                                               
53
 Farming activities typically are of a long sequence of maturation of the investment relative to other 
production alternatives, so that future markets play an important role. 
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Appendix 3 
Tax burden on Rural Sector 
 
(i) Results of sectoral tax burden in Piffano and D'Amore (2007) 
 
In Piffano and D'Amore (2007) authors make an empirical research on tax burden on the 
agricultural sector. Results show a relative high level of tax burden during the last 
decade. These results are consistent with other recent studies on agriculture sector in 
Argentina, although some minor methodologic differences are observed, specially 
dealing with the treatment of the incidence of tax on exports and VAT.54 
 
Table 1 shows the estimated sectoral tax burden (STB) for the six most important 
activities of the agrindustrial chain (AIC), which the authors used to define "Agricultural 
Sector”. The six relevant activities included are: 1) Grain Production, Oilseeds and 
Forage, 2) Animal Butchering, Conservation and Meat Processing, 3) Snuff Products, 4) 
Dairy Products; 5) Oils and Oils Byproducts and, 6) Cattle Breeding, Milk Production, 
Wool and Hair.55 
 
As “rural sector”, only two of the  six activities listed could be identified strictly tied to 
factor of production "land" , i.e. 1) Grain Production, Oilseeds and Forage; and 6) Cattle 
Breeding, Milk Production, Wool and Hair. For this reason it would not be strictly correct 
identify methodologically the tax burden on the two activities linked to the land factor 
with the results for the six activities. Anyhow in the case of primary agricultural sector, 
the effect "tax on production" due to tax on exports, happens mostly from the processed 
product industries - meat, milling and oil industries - and not directly from livestock and 
                                               
54
 In case of tax on exports including or not the effect "tax on production ", and in case of VAT, if it is 
taken into account or not the "net tax liability". Arguments about the different criteria on VAT are 
explained at the end of this appendix. 
55
 This bounded set of activities represents 43.4% of value added and 48% of the gross value of production 
of all 41 activities included in the AIC according to a previous study of “Foundación Producir 
Conservando” (see Porto, Piffano and Di Gresia, 2007). 
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grains exports. A direct measurement of tax burden on the two primary activities should 
be estimated by microsimulations' method.56 
  
Table 1 
Presión Tributaria Sectorial sobre las 6 Actividades más Importantes de la CAI 
PTS 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
PT1 56,00% 56,80% 61,30% 60,80% 59,20% 71,10% 73,20% 80,70% 82,30% 
PTFPC 50,10% 50,90% 55,50% 55,20% 53,20% 62,60% 70,90% 79,60% 80,50% 
PT4 55,00% 56,60% 61,10% 60,60% 58,90% 64,30% 61,90% 68,80% 71,00% 
PT2 49,20% 50,80% 55,30% 55,10% 52,90% 55,90% 59,60% 67,60% 69,20% 
PT Global 20,60% 21,00% 21,20% 21,50% 20,90% 19,90% 23,40% 26,40% 29,10% 
 Source: Piffano y D’Amore (2007). 
 
The differences between alternatives of measurement lie in the inclusion or exclusion of 
three components: VAT Net Liabilities, VAT “Technic Balance” (“Saldo Técnico”), and 
subsidy to domestic demand, due to reduction in domestic prices derived from tax on 
exports.57  
 
An important aspect of the comparisons is that the calculation of STB differs from the 
GTB (Global Tax Burden); the former includes the effects of transfers, operating through 
public policy decisions such as tax expenditures and the trade policy (customs tariffs and 
tax on exports). At global or consolidated level these effects cancel each other, but not at 
sectoral level. Hence, the GTB does not match the simple sum of the STB, which would 
be greater than unity. The aggregation of more sectors to calculate the tax burden cancels 
these effects, and finally with the inclusion of households, GTB is obtained. In Piffano 
and D'Amore (2007), the effect "tax on production and subsidy to domestic demand" due 
                                               
56
 Some results on microsimulations are presented later on in this appendix. 
57
 The different treatments are: 
 
PT1 
Extended Calculation: Including VAT net liability, VAT “technic balance” and domestic demand 
subsidy. 
 
PTFPC 
PTFPC Calculation (Porto, et al, 2007): Including VAT “technic balance” and domestic demand 
subsidy. Net VAT liability is not included. 
 
PT4 
Restricted Calculation 2: Including VAT Net liability and VAT “technic balance”. Subsidies to 
domestic demand are not included. 
 
PT2 
Usual Calculation: only includes VAT “technic balance”. VAT net liability are not included, 
neither subsidies to domestic demand. 
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to tax on exports, in the case of the intrasectoral implicit subsidies, ie subsidies in inputs 
used in sector production - the six activities identified as "agriculture sector" - are not 
computed. Only subsides to final demand (consumers or households) and to intermediate 
demand of others activities or sectors, are computed. In case of inputs use by the same 
sector, the commented effect of tax on exports is equivalent to the traditional notion of 
tax expenditures, ie, a tax and a subsidy unregistered affecting the same individual or 
activity, hence they should not be computed in estimation of "tax burden". 
 
(ii)  The policy changes through compensation to primary production in 2008 
 
The high tax pressure on the agricultural sector registered by the study of Piffano and 
D'Amore (2007), described above, was partially but very little offset, by the national 
government in 2008 after the conflict with the rural sector on March of that year. 
 
The study prepared by AACREA in February 2009 measured the amount and impact of 
compensation decided by the national government for type of product or activity. The 
document affirm that during 2008 the compensation paid to agroindustrial sector, which 
included the food chains of items meat, wheat, milk and chicken, were $ 3,500 million 
Argentine pesos (near U$S 1,000 millons), while the amount raised by Customs by the 
tax on exports to agriculture had been $ 22,000 million Argentine pesos (near U$S 6,300 
millons). That is, the compensation paid accounted for only 16% of export duties 
contributed by the food industry to the Government. However, analysing the activities 
receiving the grant shows that compensation benefited more to industrial activities (mills, 
dairy plants, slaughterhouses) rather than primary producers of beef, wheat, milk and 
poultry. Thus, the calculation made by the technicians of CREA Movement, from 
government data and private data sources, shows that during 2008 the beef producers 
received on average 0.11 pesos per kilo live weight as compensation; the dairy farmers, 
meanwhile, received an average of 0.07 pesos per liter of milk produced. The 
compensations expressed as a percentage of average price of each product were: meat 
producers 3.6% on the price of beef; the dairy compensation equivalent to 9.7% of milk; 
the compensation for the wheat 12.9%; and, poultry producers received 15.1% of the 
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price of chicken. Graphs 1 and 2 presented in summary AACREA the result of the study. 
Graphs 1 and 2 presented in summary AACREA the result of the study. 
 
 
 
To assess the real impact of the compensations is interesting to note the developments 
recorded in prices of primary goods sector during 2008. According to official data 
(SAGPyA), prices of meat and grains suffered significant declines during 2008. 
 
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the variations in the price of wheat, corn, soybean and 
sunflower during 2008, from January to December, and the monthly changes, measured 
at the beginning of every month, respectively. 
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Table 1 
F.O.B.  Bs.As. ( Dol/Tn )  
Grain 
Variation       
DIC 1º 2008 /        
ENE1º  2008 
Wheat -42% 
Corn -20% 
Soybean -28% 
Sunflower -18% 
Source: SAGPyA. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
The fall in international prices was significant during 2008, resulting from the global 
crisis, where the greatest reduction corresponded precisely to the case of wheat (with a 
drop of -42%) that was the only grain that received compensation above 12, 9%. The fall 
of sunflower also felt in late December with a greater reduction than price reduction 
shown in the table (-39%). 
 
In case of beef, Table 3 shows the history of the average of calf live kilo prices from 
2005. During the last 4 years the price of kilo live weight of steers had changed only by 
8% in dollars and 16.84% in pesos (taking into account changes in the average exchange 
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rate of each interval). Actually compensation of 3.6% in 2008 could not offset increases 
in the price level recorded in the rest of the national economy of around 37% according to 
the official statistics (INDEC), as shows Table 4. 
 
Table 3 
Average calf live kilo 
prices 
Evolution 
of average 
exchangte 
rate 
Evolution 
of Average 
calf live 
kilo prices 
Variation 
from 
Previous 
Year  
Variation 
2008/2005 
Year En US dolars Pesos Pesos % % 
2005 0,774 2,923 2,263 - 
2006 0,758 3,074 2,330 2,98% 
2007 0,850 3,115 2,648 13,65% 
2008 0,836 3,162 2,644 -0,16% 
16,84% 
 Source: SAGPyA. 
 
Table 4 
 
 
Wholesale Price Index 
 
 
Average 
 
Concept 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Variation 
2008-2005 
Interval 
 
GENERAL 
LEVEL 
 
252,56 
 
278,82 
 
306,74 
 
346,19 
 
37% 
 
 
NACIONAL 
LEVEL 
 
252,43 
 
279,16 
 
307,16 
 
345,79 
 
37% 
 
 
Therefore, taking into account the evolution of relative products prices and maintaining 
the tax structure on the sector - with the temporary expansion of the tax on exports rate 
that operated through Resolution 125 in 2008 - it is clear that tax burden on primary 
agricultural sector increased in comparison with the figures found in previous studies. So, 
figures confirm the conclusions reached on this document about high confiscatory level 
of tax burden on the rural sector in Argentina. 
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(iii)  The relative importance of national and provincial taxation in the consolidated 
tax burden 
 
Figures described before correspond to the notion of "consolidated STB", i.e. including 
the three levels of government; now, is important to assess the relative weight of each 
level of government (national, state/provincial and local/municipal). According to Porto, 
Piffano and Di Gresia (2007), the sharing of the three levels of government in total tax 
burden on Agroindustrial Chain (AIC), is the one shown by the Table 5. National 
participation on AIC tax burden is higher than its participation in average tax burden on 
total GDP (all activities), due to incidence of tax on exports. 
 
Table 5 
 
DETAILS OF LEVEL OF GOVERNMENTS’ SHARING IN TAX BURDEN  
TAX BURDEN ON AIC (%) 
Jurisdiction 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Nacional Taxes 82,00% 81,50% 81,60% 82,20% 82,60% 83,00% 83,70% 84,70% 85,20% 
Provincial and Local Taxes 18,00% 18,50% 18,40% 17,80% 17,40% 17,00% 16,30% 15,30% 14,80% 
  
TAX BURDEN ON TOTAL GDP  (%) 
Jurisdicción Jurisdiction 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Nacional Taxes 82,20% 78,00% 78,00% 78,70% 77,80% 79,90% 80,70% 81,40% 81,90% 
Provincial and Local Taxes 17,80% 22,00% 22,00% 21,30% 22,20% 20,10% 19,30% 18,60% 18,10% 
Source: Porto, Piffano y Di Gresia (2007). 
 
 
 (iv) Tax burden on the primary agricultural sector: the microsimulation approach 
 
Studies on yields, gross and net margins, and estimates of tax burden on the typical 
activities of the agricultural sector (such as farming - the production of soybeans, corn, 
wheat, etc. - or livestock) using the method of microsimulations are frequent. This 
approach is appropriate for addressing economic estimates relating to activities linked to 
land use, i.e., primary production. 
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In paragraph (i) of this appendix was explained the reason of why studies on tax burden 
on rural sector using national accounts data as source, must define the agricultural sector 
by incorporating industrial activities linked to primary production processing.58 
Therefore, this section intends to measure the sectoral tax burden, refering strictly to the 
primary activities, using the method of the microsimulation. 
 
The microsimulation methodology consists in building the respective accounts of 
production, gross margins, taxation - national, provincial and municipal taxes - and the 
final net result, by type of activity or product. This methodology will allow us to check 
whether the resulting tax pressures, coincides or not with those found by methodology 
based on national accounts. 
 
The study Piffano and Sturzenegger (2009) now in progress, using the microsimulation 
method to measure tax burden on rural sector, makes a calculate of the Sectoral Tax 
Burden for a set of four alternative agricultural productions, namely: corn, wheat, 
soybeans and sunflowers, at year 2008. Taxes included are those of the national level of 
government (tax on exports, tax on banks debits and credits, tax on diesel, income tax, 
VAT "technical balance", the individual property tax and social charges) and the 
subnational level: provincial tax on transactions (Ingresos Brutos), tax on seals, and 
property tax (Real Estate Tax; urban and rural). In local or municipal level, only tax for 
road conservation. The Table 1 shows the final result after tax for corn production taking 
into account the technical and economic parameters and fiscal impact at that time. Similar 
estimates were made for wheat (Table 2), soybean (Table 3) and sunflower (Table 4). In 
the case of wheat it is included the compensation of 12.9% on the price according to FAS 
estimates (AACREA, 2009). The data sources used are from publications and advice 
                                               
58
 It is misleading to make separate estimations on tax burden in linked activities to the agroindustrial chain, 
using national accounts data, because taxes on exports are of direct incidence on the producer of the 
primary commodity. In strict economic sense, an exporter is a taxpayer of the tax on exports of a 
commodity produced using primary products as input, and so he works as a mere tax holding agent of that 
tax. He adds value to a basic intermediate consumption (grain, meat, milk), valued at international prices 
net of withholding tax on exports. 
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provided by several institutions, in particular Márgenes Agropecuarios, and other 
sources.59 
Table 1 
Tax Burden on Corn 
  75 QQ/ha 95 QQ/ha 
  Market FAS Market FAS 
Final Result (after taxes) (US$/ha) 279,95 428,24 
Total taxes (US$/ha) 980,68 1260,22 
National taxes (US$/ha) 918,03 1193,04 
Subnational taxes (US$/ha) 62,65 67,18 
          Provincial taxes (US$/ha) 57,40 61,93 
          Municipal taxes (US$/ha) 5,25 5,25 
National taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 72,82 70,66 
Subnational taxes Total taxes + producer result) 4,97 3,98 
Provincial taxes / (total taxes + producer result) 4,55 3,67 
Municipipal taxes  / ( total taxes + producer result) 0,42 0,31 
Total taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 77,79 74,64 
National Government participation (%) 93,61 94,67 
Subnational Gonernments participation (%) 6,39 5,33 
           Provincial participation (%) 5,85 4,91 
           Municipal participation (%) 0,54 0,42 
Sources: own calculations based on Márgenes Agropecuarios and Bolsa de Cereales de Rosario. 
 
Table 2 
Tax Burden on Wheat 
  35 QQ/ha 45 QQ/ha 
  Market FAS Market FAS 
Final Result (after taxes) (US$/ha) 91,46 171,28 
Total taxes (US$/ha) 482,43 626,53 
National taxes (US$/ha) 427,17 568,51 
Subnational taxes (US$/ha) 55,27 58,02 
          Provincial taxes (US$/ha) 50,02 52,77 
          Municipal taxes (US$/ha) 5,25 5,25 
National taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 74,43 71,26 
Subnational taxes Total taxes + producer result) 9,63 7,27 
Provincial taxes / (total taxes + producer result) 8,72 6,61 
Municipipal taxes  / ( total taxes + producer result) 0,92 0,66 
Total taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 84,06 78,53 
National Government participation (%) 88,54 90,74 
Subnational Gonernments participation (%) 11,46 9,26 
           Provincial participation (%) 10,37 8,42 
           Municipal participation (%) 1,09 0,84 
Note: FAS price includes compensation of 12.9% according to estimates of AACREA (2009). 
        Sources: own calculations based on Márgenes Agropecuarios and Bolsa de Cereales de Rosario. 
 
                                               
59
 The estimates essentially follow methodology of Arbolabe (2008), using as data source Margenes 
Agropecuarios and Bolsa de Cereales de Rosario. 
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Table 3 
Tax Burden on Soybean 
  34QQ/ha 20 QQ/ha 
  
Market FAS Market FAS 
Final Result (after taxes) (US$/ha) 194,15 109,00 
Total taxes (US$/ha) 1128,07 692,88 
National taxes (US$/ha) 1067,94 638,71 
Subnational taxes (US$/ha) 60,13 54,17 
          Provincial taxes (US$/ha) 54,87 48,91 
          Municipal taxes (US$/ha) 5,25 5,25 
National taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 80,77 79,65 
Subnational taxes Total taxes + producer result) 4,55 6,75 
Provincial taxes / (total taxes + producer result) 4,15 6,10 
Municipipal taxes  / ( total taxes + producer result) 0,40 0,65 
Total taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 85,32 86,41 
National Government participation (%) 94,67 92,18 
Subnational Gonernments participation (%) 5,33 7,82 
           Provincial participation (%) 4,86 7,06 
           Municipal participation (%) 0,47 0,76 
            Sources: own calculations based on Márgenes Agropecuarios and Bolsa de Cereales de Rosario. 
 
Table 4 
Tax Burden on Sunflower 
  20 QQ/ha 25 QQ/ha 
  Market FAS Market FAS 
Final Result (after taxes) (US$/ha) 171,51 263,80 
Total taxes (US$/ha) 679,05 856,00 
National taxes (US$/ha) 624,29 798,95 
Subnational taxes (US$/ha) 54,77 57,05 
          Provincial taxes (US$/ha) 49,52 51,79 
          Municipal taxes (US$/ha) 5,25 5,25 
National taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 73,40 71,35 
Subnational taxes Total taxes + producer result) 6,44 5,09 
Provincial taxes / (total taxes + producer result) 5,82 4,63 
Municipipal taxes  / ( total taxes + producer result) 0,62 0,47 
Total taxes / (Total taxes + producer result) 79,84 76,44 
National Government participation (%) 91,93 93,34 
Subnational Gonernments participation (%) 8,07 6,66 
           Provincial participation (%) 7,29 6,05 
           Municipal participation (%) 0,77 0,61 
       Sources: own calculations based on Márgenes Agropecuarios and Bolsa de Cereales de Rosario. 
 
As shown in tables, there are generally no significant differences in the estimated tax 
burden, both between products and between the two variants simulated for soil 
productivity levels. Using the simple average values of the simulations carried out by 
type of crop, were obtained the following results: 
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• Corn: 76,22  
• Wheat: 81,30 
• Soybean: 85,86 
• Sunflower: 78,14 
 
Consistent with expected results, soybean has the highest tax burden, followed in 
descending order by wheat, sunflower and then finally the corn. It is interesting to 
compare these results with those calculated on national accounts basis. The values found 
and those comented in paragraph (i) confirm the similarity of the size of the estimated tax 
burden, notwithstanding the absence of any evasion parameter in the microsimulation; 
recalling: 82.3% in PT1 variant and 80.5 % in PTFPC variant, for the six most important 
activities of the agribusiness chain, both values for the year 2005 in which the 
profitability of rural activities - including livestock - was generally higher than that 
recorded in July 2008. 
 
The participations of national and subnational levels of government - with the 
predominant participation of national level of government - are also confirmed by 
simulations, as is shown in Table 5. The high participation of national level of 
government in tax burden on agriculture activity is naturally magnified in primary 
activity (ie, ignoring industrial activities linked to the processing of primary production) 
basicaly as a result of the incidence of tax on exports. The participation of each level of 
government - national and subnational levels - is the following: 
 
Tabel 5 
Crop National Level 
Subnational level 
(provinces + 
municipalities) 
Corn (PT: 76,22) 94,14% (PT: 71,75) 5,86% (PT: 4,47) 
Wheat (PT: 81,30) 89,64% (PT: 72,88) 10,36% (PT: 8,42) 
Soybean (PT: 85,86) 93,43% (PT: 80,22) 6,57% (PT: 5,64) 
Sunflower (PT: 78,14) 92,64% (PT: 72,39) 7,36% (PT: 5,75) 
Source: own calculations. 
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On the other hand, the weight of Provincial level within Subnational governments is 
predominant. The Municipal taxation is very limited (only the tax for roads 
conservation). Actually, the province represents over 90% of the taxes at the subnational 
level for the four crops considered. 
 
Tabel 6 
  Corn Wheat Soybean Sunflower 
Subnational participation (%) 
 
5,86 
 
10,36 
 
6,57 
 
 
7,36 
 
Provincial participation (%) 5,38 (91,90%) 
9,39 
(90,70%) 
5,96 
(90,69%) 
6,67 
(90,58%) 
Municipal participation (%) 
0,48 
(8,10%) 
 
0,96 
(9,30%) 
 
0,61 
(9,31%) 
 
0,69 
(9,42%) 
 
    Source: own calculations. 
 
Comparing the results with estimates of AACREA 
 
In February 2005, AACREA presented a paper on taxation in rural activities and its 
impact on economic performance of rural sector. The paper uses the microsimulation 
model for mixed farms - agricultural and livestock – and three geographic areas of the 
country. One of the simulations corresponds to a mixed farm sited in the nortwest of 
Province of Buenos Aires (Model 2). In each model were estimated two results: after-tax 
result for the mode "own land exploitation" and the after-tax result for the the mode 
"leased land". 
 
The authors conclude that the Argentine agricultural sector at that time was strongly 
affected by the consolidated tax burden carried by the three levels of government. Results 
shown in Table 7 and 8 show that the total tax burden varies for the different models or 
modes between 58% and 103% of income before taxes. 
 
In case of Model 2 the result is a tax burden of  75% in own land exploitation and 103% 
in leased land, ie for this latter, the net result after tax was negative (-3). 
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Tabel 7 
 
 
Tabel 8 
 
The tax burden estimated by AACREA (75%) - corresponding to mode of "own 
exploitation" of land - is therefore comparable with that obtained by the simulations for 
farms of similar type (Corn: 74.56%, Wheat: 80.19%, Soybeans: 87.07%; Sunflower: 
76.84%), though that tax values and relative prices used in each study were refered to two 
different years (2005 vs. 2008). However, unlike the microsimulations, AACREA do not 
includes the "VAT technician balance" in the tax burden estimations, under the idea that 
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VAT has neutral incidence at the producer level. Also, the criterion of no include the “net 
VAT” is very common in tax burden estimations due to assumption of "forward shifting", 
ie, the alleged final compensation between debits and credits tax at the producer level. 
The forward shifting is the economic consequence of tax incidence in the “long-term” of 
VAT “Destination”. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates this effect in case of a rural commodity intended partly for export. 
 
Figure 10 
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Before VAT the price which rural sector faces is P0, which provides incentives to 
produce the quantity Q0. Domestic demand absorbs Q1, leaving an exportable surplus of 
Q1Q0. After VAT, without border adjustment, the industry should bear the entire burden - 
P0BCP1 area - and the excess burden ABC. Now, with border adjustment, ie, with refund 
of the total collected by the quantity exported - DBCH area - the price for exports goes 
back to level P0. The quantity sold to domestic consumption - P0DHP1 – has no refund of 
VAT, but the rural sector will not bear the tax burden, because any price higher than P1 
will induce to shift sales towards overseas. The price (P0 > P1) changes quantity GH = 
Q3Q1 of domestic demand toward exports. This reduction in domestic supply will cause 
the domestic price rises to P2, which indicates the maximum price that domestic demand 
is willing to pay for a lesser quantity (Q3 < Q1). The new VAT on domestic consumption 
is reduced to the area P2FEP0 = P0EGP1 < P0DHP1, which means a VAT revenue 
reduction of EDHG. 
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The possibility that consumers do not bear the tax burden would be that the Government 
does not tax with the VAT the rural commodity imports. In that case, the external 
demand curve (net of deductions by the tax on exports) would play the role simultaneous 
of infinitely price elastic demand and of infinitely price elastic supply, implying the 
impossibility of forward and/or backward shifting of domestic VAT burden, because 
sales are facing P0. But in this case, the agricultural sector would export the entire 
production (thus avoiding paying VAT) and domestic demand would import the entire 
consumption (also avoiding paying the VAT). The Government would collect anything of 
VAT. Actually, it would be similar to extend the treatment of "zero rate" to all rural 
commodity sales. 
 
On the other hand, the computation of tax burden including “net VAT”, however, is 
justified on the grounds that usually tax burden calculations using the national accounts 
data, follows the direct impact criterion of the tax ("percussion" of the tax), which is the 
only way to identify who pays the tax, and not on whom finally falls the tax burden 
(incidence), that depends on market circumstances, in time and space (elasticities of 
supply and demand) in the "short term".60 
 
 
                                               
60
 For extensions of this analysis see Piffano (2007). 
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